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  INTRODUCTION   
“Relational (n): Concerning the way in which two or more 
people or things are connected.”1 
It was a dark, rainy night when Mary Churukian began her 
drive home following her sister’s graduation party.2 When the 
rain momentarily subsided, a mist engulfed the intersection of 
Chicago Boulevard and Telegraph Road when she approached. 
Churukian recalled stopping at a blinking red light before at-
tempting to cross the busy intersection.3 The next things she re-
membered were “the lights in the hospital.”4 
Churukian had collided in the intersection with a vehicle 
driven by Clayton LaGest, a serviceman returning home from 
leave.5 Among other issues, the trial court had to decide whether 
Churukian was contributorily negligent with respect to the inju-
ries she sustained from the collision.6 On this point, the plain-
tiff ’s and defense’s trial strategies markedly diverged. The direct 
examination of Mary Churukian was holistic and focused on the 
general difficulty that any person would have experienced cross-
ing the intersection under the conditions that night.7 The de-
fense attorney asked more specific questions on cross-examina-
tion, probing Churukian about the specific time of the accident, 
the exact speed at which she had been driving, whether she 
 
 1. Relational, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/relational 
[https://perma.cc/N9PT-YK7F]. The Macmillan Dictionary similarly defines re-
lationality as “relating to the . . . connection between two or more things.” Rela-
tional, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/ 
dictionary/american/relational [https://perma.cc/Q88G-NV8B]. 
 2. Churukian v. LaGest, 97 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Mich. 1959) (providing back-
ground context). 
 3. Id. (recounting the appellant’s response to a question posed at trial: “I 
came to a stop at Telegraph road. There was a red blinker light there.”). 
 4. Id. (recounting the following exchange: “Q. What is the last you remem-
ber that night? A. Putting the car in motion and observing the lights and then 
the lights in the hospital.”). 
 5. Id. at 834–35. 
 6. Id. at 833 (“After the completion of plaintiff ’s proofs the judge directed 
a verdict for defendant on the grounds of plaintiff ’s contributory negligence.”). 
 7. Id. at 834 (recounting the appellant’s answer on direct examination at 
trial: “I thought I better look to the right again and I looked and saw some lights, 
it had been raining that day and it was misty outside . . . I thought I had plenty 
of time to get through [the intersection] . . . [i]f I stopped there might be traffic 
coming from the left.”). 
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drank any alcohol at the party, and how much she had slept the 
night before.8 
The trial judge found that Churukian was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law, and Churukian appealed to the 
Michigan Supreme Court.9 Although the case was a simple ve-
hicular negligence case—and although the court was faced with 
a relatively straightforward issue of contributory negligence—
the case spawned among the justices larger philosophical ques-
tions regarding the objectives of legal conflict resolution and the 
intersection of those objectives with legal procedure. The court 
quoted large swaths of Churukian’s direct and cross-examina-
tion and remarked on the parties’ different trial strategies. In 
his concurring opinion upholding the trial court’s finding of con-
tributory negligence, Judge Smith noted diametrically opposed 
approaches to the same problem. On the one hand, the case de-
manded consideration of “factors such as visibility, the condition 
of the surface of the road, the speed of the . . . automobile, [and] 
the width of the intersection,”10 but, as Judge Smith conceded, 
“the ultimate question [is] a matter of human judgment, namely, 
whether the [defendant’s] car constitute[d] an immediate hazard 
to a safe crossing.”11 
In light of their legal positions, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the defendant encouraged the tribunal to take a scientific 
approach to determining the plaintiff ’s contributory negligence, 
and the plaintiff preferred an approach in which the tribunal 
took her perspective into account and engaged in holistic human 
understanding. More broadly, however, the manner in which tri-
bunals take factual findings into account is a hotly contested pol-
icy debate among scholars of legal institutional design.12 And de-
pending on an individual’s point of view—whether she 
prioritizes the accuracy of the underlying fact finding or the ho-
listic, relational judgments that often accompany it—she might 
identify one approach as superior to the other, such that she is 
more willing to legitimize tribunals that employ that approach. 
 
 8. Id. As an example, the court recounted the following question: “Now, 
could you give me an estimate as to how fast your car was traveling at that time 
in miles per hour, whether 10 miles an hour or 5 or 15?” Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 838. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Per-
spective on Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. REV. 323 (1997); see also infra Parts I.A, II.A. 
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Legal institutional design involves the development of for-
mal and informal rules, the enforcement characteristics that un-
derlie those rules, and the behavioral norms that foster and 
structure repeated interactions between the public and a legal 
institution.13 The underlying goal of successful institutional de-
sign is the public’s willingness to legitimize decisions rendered 
by legal institutions.14 This extends beyond legitimizing the sub-
stantive legal rules—and the application of those legal rules to 
individual factual disputes—that are embodied in a tribunal’s 
legal decisions. It extends to the procedural rules that govern a 
tribunal’s decisions, which often exert more influence than do 
substantive outcomes on the public’s willingness to legitimize le-
gal institutions.15 
The first comprehensive theory of institutional design, vis-
à-vis dispute resolution, appeared in the California Law Review 
in 1978. This groundbreaking article—titled A Theory of Proce-
dure and coauthored by psychologist John Thibaut and law pro-
fessor Laurens Walker—opined that establishing factual truth 
and providing justice to litigants are the main objectives of dis-
pute resolution.16 From this guiding principle, they taxonomized 
all social disputes as falling primarily into one of two categories: 
cognitive conflicts, which prioritize establishing the truth of the 
dispute, and conflicts of interest, which prioritize providing a 
just allocation of resources between disputing parties.17 They 
also taxonomized legal procedures as either inquisitorial, which 
prioritizes establishing truth and vests control of the evidence in 
a central decision maker, or adversarial, which prioritizes justice 
 
 13. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychology and Institutional Design, 4 REV. L. & 
ECON. 801 (2008) (explaining the relationship between psychological research 
and the concept of institutional legitimacy); see also INKE MATHAUER & GUY 
CARRIN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT (2010), BACKGROUND 
PAPER NO. 36: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
PRACTICE FOR HEALTH FINANCING PERFORMANCE AND UNIVERSAL COVERAGE, 
https://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/ 
36Institutional.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCB6-XHKZ]. 
 14. Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legit-
imacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting 
Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1097 (2014). 
 15. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS 2–3 (1975). For an in-depth discussion, see infra Part II.A. 
 16. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 541 (1978). 
 17. Id. at 543–44. See also infra Part I.A.2 for an in-depth analysis. 
  
2020] [RELATIONAL] THEORY OF PROCEDURE 1991 
 
and allocates substantial control over the evidence to the disput-
ing parties.18 Although Thibaut and Walker do not overtly dis-
cuss their theory in terms of institutional legitimacy, they argue 
that “purely scientific” disputes—which they deem “cognitive 
conflicts”—should be resolved inquisitorially in the administra-
tive arena, whereas all legal cases—which they deem “conflicts 
of interest”—should be resolved in trials that follow adversarial 
dispute resolution procedures.19 
Thibaut and Walker’s influential theory of institutional de-
sign has been cited in over 100 law review articles and in several 
important treatises.20 Yet in the four decades since they pub-
lished their theory, no one has directly tested whether the public 
does, in fact, categorize legal cases as cognitive conflicts or con-
flicts of interest, whether the public believes that inquisitorial 
procedures prioritize the establishment of truth (and adversarial 
procedures prioritize justice), or whether the public believes that 
truth and justice are, in fact, the ultimate goals of legal dispute 
resolution. Moreover, advances in the field of social psychology—
including social identity theory and the group-value model of in-
tergroup dynamics21—suggest that dichotomizing legal disputes 
and legal procedures does not fully capture: (1) the public’s be-
liefs about the values inherent in those cases and procedures; 
and (2) the conditions under which the public is willing to legiti-
mize those procedures and the legal institutions that employ 
them. 
 
 18. Id. at 555; see also FREDERICK BEUTEL, DEMOCRACY OR THE SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD IN LAW AND POLICY MAKING (1965) (opining on the suitability of these 
procedures for scientific discourse). 
 19. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 554–59. 
 20. A citation count in the legal search engine WestlawNextTM reveals that 
Thibaut and Walker’s article has been cited in 122 varied legal academic works, 
including articles in the Yale Law Journal and Harvard Law Review, and in 
treatises such as DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 2.27 (2019–2020 ed. 2019) and 
DEMONTHENES LORANDOS & TERENCE CAMPBELL, CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTS 
IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES §§ 1:10, 11:2 (2019). A citation count in the aca-
demic search engine Google ScholarTM reveals an additional fifty-four citations 
outside the law review literature, including citations in the prestigious Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology and in several interdisciplinary works. See, 
e.g., CLYDE H. COOMBS & GEORGE S. AVRUNIN, THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT 
235 (1988); Tyler, supra note 12, at 326.  
 21. See Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI. 
INFO. 65 (1974); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority 
in Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992). For further 
discussion of these concepts, see infra Part II.B.2. 
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This Article fills that gap. It proposes an updated, comple-
mentary model of procedural and institutional legitimacy that 
focuses on the social psychological concept of relationality. In do-
ing so, it is the first Article to test empirically the central claims 
of A Theory of Procedure and expand upon the theory in critical 
ways. For example, it proposes rethinking Thibaut and Walker’s 
dichotomy of disputes and procedures and reimagining them as 
falling on a relationality continuum—such that disputes that 
center on factual uncertainty are lower in relationality, and dis-
putes that primarily require fact finders to make relational com-
parisons (such as evaluating alleged negligent behavior against 
a reasonable person standard) are higher in relationality. In so 
doing, this Article challenges Thibaut and Walker’s assertion 
that all legal cases, as opposed to disputes regarding scientific 
principles, are “conflicts of interest” that should be resolved ad-
versarially. 
This Article reports several findings from three original ex-
periments. First, it confirms that the public views the objectives 
of legal dispute resolution as resolving questions of factual truth 
as well as procedural and distributive justice.22 Second, it 
demonstrates that the public does not perceive all legal cases as 
concerned primarily with questions of justice. Rather, the public 
perceives disputes low in relationality (such as “whodunit” mur-
der cases) as far more concerned with questions of truth than of 
justice, and vice versa for disputes high in relationality.23 More-
over, differences in perceived relationality extend to the phases 
of a legal trial as well; the public perceives the liability phase as 
primarily concerned with truth, and the punishment phase as 
primarily concerned with the just allocation of resources.24 The 
second study reports that the public believes that different legal 
procedures prioritize different psychological values; they per-
ceive adversarial procedures as concerned primarily with proce-
dural justice and inquisitorial procedures as concerned with fac-
tual accuracy.25 Finally, the third study suggests that an 
alignment of the dispute’s purpose and the priority of the proce-
dure that resolves it—for example, a dispute centering on factual 
accuracy paired with an inquisitorial procedure—results in 
 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
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greater public willingness to legitimize the legal tribunal and its 
ultimate decision.26 
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I provides an 
overview of the arguments in Thibaut and Walker’s article, A 
Theory of Procedure. Part II provides the framework for a rela-
tional model of procedure and its implications for institutional 
legitimacy. This Part incorporates insights from social identity 
theory and legal psychologist Tom Tyler’s group-value model to 
understand the circumstances under which the public is most 
likely to legitimize legal institutions. Part III tests Thibaut and 
Walker’s theory—alongside the relational model of institutional 
legitimacy—by presenting the results from three original exper-
iments that suggest that institutional legitimacy results from an 
alignment of the relational goals of the legal proceeding and the 
relational priorities of the procedure that resolves the dispute. 
Part IV explores the policy implications of these findings, their 
limitations, and future directions for legal institutional design. 
I.  “A THEORY OF PROCEDURE”   
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the main argu-
ments for legal institutional design advanced in Thibaut and 
Walker’s article, A Theory of Procedure. In describing their the-
ory, this Part discusses the historical backdrop on which the the-
ory rests, as well as the theory’s implications and limitations. 
A. THIBAUT AND WALKER’S THEORY 
The 1960s was a time for upheaval with respect to politics, 
social mores, and even public scientific discourse. In the latter 
part of the decade, there was growing discontent that the public 
discussion regarding matters of scientific inquiry and public pol-
icy was becoming increasingly politicized.27 In response, several 
models for a “science court,” which purported to reduce political 
interference with respect to questions of science relevant to pub-
lic policy, were introduced.28 These models had several forms, 
but they were concerned primarily with unmooring questions of 
 
 26. See infra Part III.C. 
 27. See Allan Mazur, The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4 
RISK 161, 161–62 (1993).  
 28. See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 
AM. SCI. 505 (1975) [hereinafter Kantrowitz, Controlling Tech]; Arthur Kantro-
witz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCI. 763 (1967) 
[hereinafter Kantrowitz, Proposal]; John Noble Wilford, Science Considers Its 
Own ‘Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1976, at E8. 
  
1994 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1987 
 
objective scientific fact from political biases.29 Although the mod-
els varied with respect to the methods for achieving this objec-
tive, many of the proposals focused on the selection of triers with 
substantial expertise in the area of relevant scientific inquiry. A 
significant point of contention, however, was whether the “court” 
should be held in the political arena with quasi-administrative 
hearings, or in the courthouse in the form of quasi-adversarial 
hearings.30 Although the concept of the science court, whatever 
its form, was met with initial enthusiasm from the legislative 
and executive branches, it ultimately failed to gain traction.31 
 
 29. See Kantrowitz, Proposal, supra note 28, at 763–64; see also Troyen A. 
Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alterna-
tive Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law 
Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 62–71 (1989); William V. Luneburg & Mark A. 
Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alterna-
tives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 
887, 908 (1981). 
 30. See Kantrowitz, Controlling Tech, supra note 28, at 507. For a more in-
depth discussion of the “science court” debates, see Andrew W. Jurs, Science 
Court: Past Proposals, Current Considerations, and a Suggested Structure, 15 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2010); Justin Sevier, Redesigning the Science Court, 73 MD. 
L. REV. 770 (2014). 
 31. See Wilford, supra note 28. For example, and as I have written in Rede-
signing the Science Court:  
  Kantrowitz’s proposal enjoyed political momentum in the period 
before the election of 1976. President Ford supported the proposal and 
his administration created a task force to evaluate the proposal fur-
ther. This task force released a favorable interim report, made recom-
mendations to refine the proposal, and announced its intention to con-
vene a public hearing on the science court, in which legal and scientific 
policymakers could comment on the proposal more fully.  
  In the fall of 1976, just two months before the presidential election, 
the task force convened a contentious public hearing in Leesburg, Vir-
ginia. Among the various suggestions from the participants was the 
need for a “test case” to examine the viability of a political science court. 
That may have been, however, all upon which the participants agreed. 
Significant criticisms of the political science court emerged ranging 
from the philosophical—for example, doubt that objective scientific 
facts could really be separated from sociopolitical questions of morality, 
and a concern that providing “finality” to scientific disputes is anath-
ema to the scientific method—to the practical—for example, a concern 
that incorporating cross-examination would increase expenses and in-
terfere with the process of determining the “true” scientific facts. 
Bluntly, critics of the political science court labeled it “profoundly na-
ïve, internally inconsistent, and inherently unworkable.”  
  Despite the proposal’s broad-based support, as the 1976 presiden-
tial election passed and the Ford Administration gave way to President 
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It was against this cultural and political background that 
psychologist John Thibaut and law professor Laurens Walker 
proffered a new theory of conflict resolution. In A Theory of Pro-
cedure, which they published in the California Law Review in 
1978, Thibaut and Walker advocated for the development of a 
political forum to evaluate questions of scientific inquiry sepa-
rate from the resolution of legal disputes in the courtroom.32 
Their theory differed markedly from the previous “science court” 
proposals of the 1960s and 1970s in an important way: it relied 
almost entirely on a developing body of empirical social science 
research applied in the context of the legal system. Perhaps most 
controversially—and as the title of their article suggests—they 
argued that the success of any program of institutional design 
rests not just on the substantive rules and incentives that the 
program creates, but also on the specifics of the procedures that 
are used to effectuate those rules and incentives.33 So whereas 
the political and judicial science court proposals focused primar-
ily on characteristics of the decision maker itself—such as the 
tribunal’s specialized expertise—Thibaut and Walker’s theory 
focused instead on the values inherent in the process by which a 
dispute is resolved.34 
Thibaut and Walker proffer three arguments in service of 
their broad theory of effective conflict resolution. They begin by 
“recogniz[ing] the fundamental dichotomy between the potential 
dispute resolution objectives of ‘truth’ and ‘justice.’”35 They de-
fine the truth objective as the ability of the legal tribunal to un-
earth correctly the facts that underlie the dispute.36 They define 
the justice objective as both distributive—the extent to which the 
 
James Carter’s Administration, political winds shifted against the po-
litical “science court.” The Carter Administration was much less enthu-
siastic about the proposal, and the test case for the proposal never ma-
terialized. As quickly as it began, the political “science court” 
experiment had ended. 
Sevier, supra note 30, at 788–89 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Allan Mazur, 
The Science Court: Reminiscence & Retrospective, 4 RISK 161, 163–65 (1993); 
then citing Jurs, supra note 30, at 12; and then citing Wilford, supra note 28). 
 32. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16. 
 33. Id. at 565–66. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 541; see also id. at 543 (“The theory begins with the distinction 
between the two conflict resolution objectives of ‘justice’ and ‘truth.’ We contend 
that in most instances one or the other of these objectives is dictated by the 
subject matter of the dispute, or more specifically by the outcome relationship 
that exists between the individual parties to the conflict.”).  
 36. Id. at 541–42. 
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outcome of the dispute is fair—and procedural, which refers to 
the fairness of the process used to resolve the dispute.37 Thibaut 
and Walker implicitly argue that truth and justice are related 
but distinct goals, and that they may be implicated to differing 
degrees in different disputes.38 This claim serves as the lynchpin 
of their theory.39 
1. Taxonomy of Conflicts 
On this central premise, Thibaut and Walker argue that all 
disputes—for example, over scientific principles, civil matters, 
criminal matters, and administrative actions—can be classified 
to the degree that they are differentially focused on the objec-
tives of truth or justice.40 They argue that most disputes can be 
dichotomized as either “cognitive conflicts” or “conflicts of inter-
est,” with a small number of disputes classified as “mixed.”41 
They argue that “cognitive conflicts” are disputes that focus on 
truth, whereas “conflicts of interest” center on justice.42 
From Thibaut and Walker’s perspective, the resolution of a 
cognitive conflict uniformly enhances the interests and outcomes 
of all affected parties, whereas a contrary resolution would uni-
formly reduce the outcomes for all parties.43 Thus, in a purely 
cognitive conflict, all parties seek the correct factual solution to 
the issue that caused the dispute. Thibaut and Walker describe 
scientific inquiry as “the prototype of cognitive conflict in a set-
ting of common interest,” because the idealized role of the scien-
tist is to uncover truth in a disinterested manner.44 
In contrast, Thibaut and Walker argue that all other dis-
putes are “conflicts of interest.” In such disputes, the parties’ in-
 
 37. Id. at 544 (discussing “the proper distribution” of resources between 
parties). 
 38. See id. at 543. This proposition necessarily follows from their argument 
and has been partially tested empirically. See Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice 
Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adver-
sarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212 (2014). 
 39. This claim is theoretical, insofar as Thibaut and Walker do not argue 
that the public perceives “truth” and “justice” to be the twin aims of conflict res-
olution. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 543.  
 40. Id. at 543–44. 
 41. Id. at 541–42 (proposing a “two-stage procedure” for resolving mixed 
disputes). 
 42. Id. at 543–44. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 543. 
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terests are diametrically opposed, because any particular solu-
tion will maximize the outcome—and therefore the resource al-
location—for one disputant at the expense of another.45 In these 
disputes, the parties will not agree that any one solution pro-
vided by the decision maker is the “correct” solution; instead, the 
quality of the tribunal’s decisions will be judged by the distribu-
tion of outcomes among the disputants.46 Thibaut and Walker 
argue that civil and criminal litigation comprise the classic “con-
flict of interest”; patent disputes, disputes over the allocation of 
trust or estate assets, and disputes over the identity of the per-
petrator of a crime all involve decisions in which either money 
flows from one party to another, or where the state and the de-
fendant “seek incompatible outcomes.”47 
Thibaut and Walker clarified, however, that cognitive con-
flicts are not concerned with “truth” to the exclusion of “justice” 
concerns, and vice versa with respect to conflicts of interest.48 
Rather, the taxonomy turns on the primary objective of these 
disputes. Cognitive conflicts are primarily focused on establish-
ing factual truth through which justice is attained as a logical 
consequence, but not as a primary consideration.49 Conversely, 
conflicts of interests involve predicate factual determinations, 
but these are subordinate to the more important objective, which 
is the fair allocation of resources among the disputants.50 Thi-
baut and Walker recognize that there may be a degree of overlap 
between cognitive conflicts and conflicts of interest on this di-
mension.51 Yet they characterize these disputes as rare conflicts 
 
 45. Id. at 544. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 544 (discussing these disputes and mentioning others, including 
disputes over land). 
 48. Id. at 544–45. 
 49. Id. at 545 (noting that “[i]n science, the facts found have an enduring 
significance because they guide future conduct”). 
 50. Id. (“The significance of factual determinations in a legal proceeding 
generally ends with the division of outcomes and there is no future reliance on 
the cognitive decision.”). 
 51. Id. at 542. 
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of interest that have spillover effects for society beyond the dis-
putants’ distributive outcomes.52 Thibaut and Walker’s taxon-
omy of conflicts appears in Figure 1 below.53 
 
Figure 1. Thibaut & Walker’s Taxonomy of Conflicts. 
2. Taxonomy of Procedures 
The final element of Thibaut and Walker’s theory involves 
the procedures by which tribunals resolve cognitive conflicts and 
conflicts of interest. They view the purpose of procedural rules 
as defining and maintaining the roles of the disputant vis-à-vis 
the decision-making tribunal in the course of the proceedings.54 
Specifically, procedural rules govern the degree of control that 
participants exert on the proceedings. Thibaut and Walker argue 
that different decision-making procedures can be taxonomized 
according to two forms of control that tribunals either afford or 
deny disputants.55 They define decision control as the degree to 
which the disputants can unilaterally dictate the outcome of the 
dispute.56 In contrast, process control refers to the ability of ei-
ther the disputants or the decision maker to control the develop-
ment and selection of the information from which the tribunal 
will resolve the dispute.57 Process control therefore refers not 
 
 52. Id. at 566 (“Finally, certain rare but important decision-making prob-
lems involve both cognitive conflict and conflict of interest. For resolving these 
disputes, we propose a two-staged procedure that separates questions of truth 
from questions of justice and employs an appropriate process for each.”). 
 53. This illustration originally appeared in A Theory of Procedure. Id. at 
560. 
 54. Id. at 545. 
 55. Id. at 546. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (defining the term as “control over the development and selection of 
information that will constitute the basis for resolving the dispute”). 
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just to the disputants’ ability to present evidence to the tribunal, 
but their control over the investigatory and discovery procedures 
as well. The interaction between the degree of decision control 
and process control afforded to disputants determines the overall 
distribution of control at the proceeding, insofar as reducing the 
control exercised by the disputants expands the control exerted 
by the tribunal.58 
Against this background, Thibaut and Walker argue that, at 
their core, there are two major dispute resolution procedures: an 
adversarial (disputing) procedure and an inquisitorial (auto-
cratic) procedure.59 These procedures differ markedly in the de-
gree of control that they afford disputants. In the autocratic, in-
quisitorial model—characteristic of most dispute resolution 
tribunals in continental Europe—both decision control and pro-
cess control are ceded by the disputants to the tribunal.60 A cen-
tral decision maker (or panel of decision makers) collects the in-
formation necessary to resolve the dispute, while hearing from 
the disputants at the central decision maker’s whim.61  
In the disputing, adversarial model—characteristic of tribu-
nals in the United States, England, and other common law coun-
tries—control is split.62 The tribunal retains full decision control 
but cedes a substantial degree of process control to the dispu-
tants. Although the tribunal—either one decision maker or a 
panel of triers—renders the decision, the tribunal does so only 
after the disputants investigate the facts underlying the conflict 
and present information to the tribunal for consideration.63  
These procedural paradigms, according to Thibaut and 
Walker, give rise to different priorities vis-à-vis the objectives of 
truth and justice in conflict resolution. Vesting both decision and 
process control in the hands of a disinterested central decision 
maker, as in the inquisitorial procedure, provides the tribunal 
with a “single ‘selection strategy’ that will generate information 
 
 58. Id. (noting that it “therefore determines the essential character of the 
procedures”). 
 59. Id. at 555–56. Thibaut and Walker recognize substantial nuance in the 
space between “pure” adversarial and “pure” inquisitorial dispute resolution 
procedures (for example, a “bargaining” procedure that affords disputants total 
process and decision control), although it is not directly relevant here. For a 
discussion, see id. at 555–59. 
 60. Id. at 547. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 552. 
 63. Id. 
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appropriate to the inquiry.”64 This strategy (1) increases the like-
lihood that relevant evidence will be discovered and produced, 
and (2) reduces the transaction and agency costs involved in as-
similating and tracking that information.65 The inquisitorial 
procedure therefore prioritizes the establishment of factual 
truth.66 
 
 64. Id. at 547 (citing J.S. BRUNER ET AL., A STUDY OF THINKING (1956)). 
 65. Id. at 548 (“Such a selection strategy increases the likelihood of obtain-
ing the relevant information, reduces the strain of assimilating and tracking 
information, and minimizes the risk of failing to reach the correct solution 
within a limited number of attempts.”). 
 66. The existing research, much of it relied upon by Thibaut and Walker, 
suggests that the picture is more complex. I have written about this research in 
an earlier work, The Truth Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy 
and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, and I 
reproduce the relevant section here:  
  Researchers have studied a decision-making procedure’s pursuit of 
truth, or decisional accuracy, by examining the objective truth that it 
produces and the perceptions of truth that it produces among liti-
gants . . . . Thibaut and Walker hypothesized that the inquisitorial sys-
tem produces objective truth by vesting control over the flow of evi-
dence with the decision maker. This suggests that the inquisitorial 
system produces greater truth than does the adversarial system, in 
which biased advocates control the presentation of potentially biased 
evidence to the decision maker. A competing hypothesis states, how-
ever, that evidence may be vetted more vigorously in the adversarial 
system, where motivated advocates cross-examine their adversary’s 
witnesses and expose weaknesses in their adversary’s case. 
  Lind, Thibaut, and Walker tested these competing hypotheses. 
[They] asked participants to gather facts—and to transmit those facts 
to the court—as either a client-centered, adversarial advocate or as an 
unbiased, inquisitorial investigator. The study revealed few differences 
in fact-finding diligence between participants in the inquisitorial and 
adversarial conditions, but the study revealed substantial differences 
in the transmission of facts. Participants in the adversarial condition 
transmitted to the court nearly none of the facts they uncovered that 
disfavored their client, while participants in the inquisitorial condition 
transmitted to the decision maker nearly the same proportion of posi-
tive and negative facts that they uncovered. The study suggests that 
the adversarial system may shield from the decision maker facts that 
are unfavorable to the parties, which in turn may lead to inaccurate 
decisions. Other researchers have replicated these findings. 
  A smaller body of research, however, suggests that the adversarial 
system may counteract decisionmaker bias in a manner that the in-
quisitorial system does not. These researchers hypothesized that in-
quisitorial decision makers may prematurely characterize a defendant 
as guilty if the initial facts of the defendant’s case are similar to the 
facts of other cases in which defendants were found guilty. This, in 
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The adversarial procedure, however, prioritizes different 
ends. Thibaut and Walker argue that procedures that allow the 
parties to perform their own investigation into the facts of the 
dispute and present those findings to the decision maker provide 
the parties with a greater opportunity to influence the outcome 
of the dispute.67 Specifically, parties with more information than 
the decision maker will be able to produce information from their 
own perspective, “with full particularities and contexts.”68 Be-
cause the information comes from self-interested disputants, 
however, it runs the risk of bias.69  
Nonetheless, the ability to control the flow of information to 
the decision maker—and to ultimately shape the outcome of the 
dispute—leads to increased perceptions that the dispute was re-
solved fairly, which is a central tenet of the justice objective of 
conflict resolution.70  
 
turn, may lead to the biased assimilation of facts in the current defend-
ant’s case. Thibaut et al. tested this hypothesis by varying (a) the in-
formation about prior cases that was given to the decision maker and 
(b) the type of procedure used to evaluate the dispute. The researchers 
found that judgments of decision makers in the inquisitorial condition 
were influenced by the outcomes of similar prior cases, whereas the 
judgments of decision makers in the adversarial condition were not. 
Thibaut et al. concluded that at least one aspect of the adversarial sys-
tem reduces bias better than does the inquisitorial system. 
Sevier, supra note 38, at 212–13 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (first 
citing Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16; then citing THIBAUT & WALKER, supra 
note 15; then citing ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1975); 
then citing E. Allen Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Ad-
versary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L REV. 1129 (1973); then cit-
ing Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testi-
monial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980); then citing E. Allan Lind & Laurens 
Walker, Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Laboratory Research on Le-
gal Issues, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 5–18 (1979); and then citing John Thibaut et 
al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
386, 386–401 (1972)). 
 67. Thibaut and Walker, supra note 16, at 548–52. 
 68. Id. at 551. 
 69. Id. at 558–59. 
 70. Social psychologists have defined the justice afforded by decision-mak-
ing procedures as the perception among people that the decision-making process 
itself is fair and equitable. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15; see also E. 
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988). See generally Craig A. Wendorf et al., Social 
Justice and Moral Reasoning: An Empirical Integration of Two Paradigms in 
Psychological Research, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 19 (2002) (elaborating on two para-
  
2002 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1987 
 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND GAPS 
Based on these assertions, Thibaut and Walker make sev-
eral recommendations for effective conflict resolution and legal 
reform. Their central claim is that scientific inquiry, a purely 
 
digms of “theoretical and empirical work regarding the concept of justice”). Re-
searchers have found that the decision maker’s neutrality, the degree of respect 
that the decision maker confers on the parties, the amount of voice and control 
that the parties have over the legal dispute, and the degree to which parties can 
trust the decision maker’s motive to be fair influence people’s perceptions of 
procedural justice. LIND & TYLER, supra. 
  As I have written earlier in The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of 
Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Le-
gal Systems: 
  If perceptions of procedural justice are determined, in part, by the 
amount of voice and control that the decision maker affords litigants, 
the adversarial model—which affords litigants more control over the 
proceedings than does a pure inquisitorial model—should be perceived 
as more just. To the extent that heightened perceptions of procedural 
justice lead to greater preferences for a procedure, a body of research 
supports this hypothesis. In their earlier work, Thibaut and Walker 
found that, controlling for the outcome of a legal dispute, people gener-
ally report higher preferences for adversarial procedures compared 
with inquisitorial procedures. Other researchers have found similar ef-
fects.  
  A smaller body of research, however, suggests that the adversarial 
system might not always be perceived as more just than the inquisito-
rial procedure. [Researchers] Anderson and Otto found cultural differ-
ences with respect to litigants’ perceptions of procedural fairness. Alt-
hough Americans preferred the adversarial system and perceived it to 
be fairer than the inquisitorial system, Dutch participants preferred 
the inquisitorial system and perceived it to be fairer than the adversar-
ial system. Furthermore, [researchers] Austin and Tobiasen have 
found that inquisitorial procedures are perceived as just as fair as ad-
versarial procedures if participants believe that the procedures are im-
plemented reasonably. 
Sevier, supra note 38, at 213 (footnotes omitted) (first citing THIBAUT & 
WALKER, supra note 15; then citing Pauline Houlden et al., Preference for Modes 
of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EX-
PER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 (1978); then citing Stephen LaTour, et al., Some Deter-
minants of Preference for Modes of Conflict Resolution, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
319 (1976); then citing L. Walker et al., Reactions to Participants and Observers 
to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 295–310 (1974); then 
citing R. A. Anderson & A. L. Otto, Perceptions of Fairness in the Justice System: 
A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 31 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 557, 557–63 
(2003); then citing William Austin & Joyce M. Tobiasen, Legal Justice and the 
Psychology of Conflict Resolution, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 227–74 (Robert 
Folger ed., 1984); and then citing N.J. Brekke at al., Of Juries and Court-Ap-
pointed Experts: The Impact of Nonadversarial Versus Adversarial Expert Tes-
timony, 15 L. HUM. BEHAV. 451, 451–75 (1991)). 
  
2020] [RELATIONAL] THEORY OF PROCEDURE 2003 
 
“cognitive conflict” concerned ultimately with questions of truth, 
is unsuitable for the adversarial legal system and should be re-
solved by an inquisitorial administrative body.71 All other dis-
putes—including all legal disputes—are conflicts of interest that 
are concerned predominantly with questions of justice.72 These 
disputes should therefore be resolved through adversarial proce-
dures.73 
Thibaut and Walker’s policy recommendations have proven 
influential, insofar as A Theory of Procedure has been cited by 
myriad scholars and policymakers.74 But they are also subject to 
significant limitations. Most importantly, although Thibaut and 
Walker’s theory speaks to questions of institutional design, it is 
not a theory of institutional legitimacy. As discussed in more de-
tail, infra, psychological legitimacy is based on public perceptions 
of the values embodied in substantive and procedural legal 
rules.75 And although Thibaut and Walker base the principles of 
their theory on empirical social science, in the four decades since 
they published their article, no one has tested empirically  
(1) what the public believes to be the objectives of conflict reso-
lution, (2) whether the public sees different types of cases as im-
plicating different conflict resolution objectives, and (3) whether 
the public perceives legal procedures as prioritizing these objec-
tives differently.76 
In fact, there are several reasons to believe that Thibaut and 
Walker’s taxonomy of cases and procedures does not capture 
fully the public’s attitudes toward different conflict resolution 
procedures and the extent to which the public is willing to legit-
imize them. As this Article discusses below, by framing their the-
ory in terms of the “science court” debate, Thibaut and Walker 
classify all non-scientific disputes as conflicts of interest subject 
 
 71. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16. 
 72. Id. at 557–58. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and 
the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and En-
gagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 78 (2014) (“The empirical study of 
legitimacy has demonstrated that when authorities are viewed as legitimate 
they are better able to motivate people to comply with the law.”); see also infra 
Part II.A.  
 76. Although a handful of researchers have indirectly tested certain aspects 
of Thibaut and Walker’s theory, see, e.g., Sevier, supra note 38 and accompany-
ing text, no one has comprehensively tested the theory in the context of its im-
plications for institutional legitimacy. 
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to adversarial legal resolution.77 But there are reasons to be-
lieve—based on recent social psychological research on social 
identity theory and the group-value model—that the public does 
not perceive all legal disputes as conflicts of interest concerned 
primarily with questions of justice.78 Rather, there likely is sub-
stantial variation among the public with respect to the perceived 
objectives of different legal cases. If so, policymakers may need 
to reevaluate the axiom that all legal disputes should be resolved 
adversarially.  
II.  A RELATIONAL THEORY OF PROCEDURE   
The following section reframes Thibaut and Walker’s theory 
to more accurately reflect the public’s perceptions of the aims of 
legal conflict resolution and the means by which disputes are re-
solved, in an effort to articulate a comprehensive theory of insti-
tutional legitimacy. It does so by focusing on the psychological 
concept of relationality. This expanded theory yields a more com-
plete picture of the conditions under which the public legitimizes 
different conflict resolution procedures. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 
Institutional legitimacy is an amorphous concept with im-
plications for all aspects of an individual’s life, specifically with 
respect to the manner in which she is governed by those in 
power.79 I have written in detail elsewhere regarding the phe-
nomenon’s scholarly origins: 
  Legitimacy as a political theory has its roots at least as far back as 
the Enlightenment, when moral philosopher John Locke famously 
opined that “the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on 
with the consent of the governed.”  
  [Building on this axiom,] political theorists describe the concept of 
[institutional] legitimacy as the status and acceptance that governed 
people confer onto their governors’ institutions and conduct based on 
the belief that those actions constitute an appropriate use of power. 
 
 77. See infra Part II. 
 78. See Tajfel, supra note 21; Tyler & Lind, supra note 21; see also infra 
Part II.B. 
 79. See Justin Sevier, Evidentiary Trapdoors, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1155, 1195 
(2018) (introducing a “behavioral model regarding the effects of trapdoor evi-
dence on the courts’ institutional legitimacy”); see also JOHN R. SCHERMERHORN 
ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Lisé Johnson ed., 12th ed. 2011) (discuss-
ing “interactional justice” between social actors); CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND 
LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004) (discussing governmental legit-
imacy). 
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According to German sociologist Max Weber, the governed confer legit-
imacy onto legal actors via an alignment of values between the political 
actors and the governed—that is, through public trust that the govern-
ment will act in the interests of the governed—and not through the 
government’s coercion or force. Therefore, to the extent that a misa-
lignment develops between the values of the governed and the actions 
of the government, political [and institutional] legitimacy is endan-
gered.80 
Legitimacy is therefore an important extension of institu-
tional design, insofar as it is based on the public’s attitudes to-
ward a governing body and extends to the public’s willingness to 
abide by the governing body’s decisions.81 As, again, I have writ-
ten elsewhere: 
  Numerous interdisciplinary scholars have attempted to explain the 
theories that underlie people’s willingness to legitimize governmental 
action. Broadly speaking, these theories fall into two camps. The first 
camp is often referred to as “output,” “instrumental,” or “goal-attain-
ment” legitimacy. This theory posits that legitimacy is derived almost 
entirely from substantive outcomes for either society at large or, more 
specifically, for the individuals affected by governmental action. Thus, 
under this theory legitimacy is a function of social exchange, insofar as 
exchanges and interactions with governmental actors resulting in a 
positive distribution of goods to the governed create a greater willing-
ness among the governed to legitimize the governmental action. 
  In contrast, a second theory of psychological legitimacy is referred 
to as “substantive” or “relational” legitimacy. In contrast to the instru-
mental, goal-oriented model, this model posits a relational, equity-
based manner in which governmental actors attain popular [and insti-
tutional] legitimacy. The theory posits that a government attains legit-
imacy through its procedural responsiveness to the concerns of its citi-
zens by allowing them to meaningfully participate in the governmental 
process.82 
 
 80. Sevier, supra note 79, at 1169–70 (footnotes omitted) (first citing JOHN 
LOCKE: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 524 (R. Ashcraft ed., 1991); then citing JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 135 (1971) (discussing a similar theory of legiti-
macy); then citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 80 (1986); then cit-
ing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 29 (2006); then citing MAX WE-
BER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 79 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., 1991); then citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 121 (1993) (suggesting “that political institutions that lack legiti-
macy exercise their power unjustifiably and will not be obeyed”); and then citing 
THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15, at 7). Weber’s idea that the governed confer 
legitimacy via an alignment of values is also sometimes referred to as “civil le-
gitimacy.” Id. at 1170 n.71. 
 81. See Tyler & Jackson, supra note 75.  
 82. Sevier, supra note 79, at 1170 (footnotes omitted) (first citing THIBAUT 
& WALKER, supra note 15, at 7 (theorizing that people view as legitimate gov-
ernmental actions those that are instrumental to the individual’s attainment of 
social goods); then citing Florian Weigand, Investigating the Role of Legitimacy 
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That theory has attained empirical support in the form of le-
gal psychologist Tom R. Tyler’s group-value model.83 As Profes-
sor Tyler and I have explained: 
The relational [group-value] model of legitimacy argues that people 
value the [governmental actor’s] use of fair procedures because those 
procedures carry messages of status and inclusion which reinforce peo-
ple’s identification with legal institutions and authorities and support 
their feelings of inclusion and status in the community. This then leads 
to high self-worth and favorable self-esteem. When people can present 
their concerns to judicial authorities and feel that those authorities 
consider and take account of their concerns, people’s identification with 
law and legal authorities is strengthened.84 
In light of the modern social science research on institutional 
legitimacy, this Article proffers a new theory of procedure that 
incorporates as its central feature the psychological concept of 
relationality. It argues that psychological relationality as a con-
ceptual framework has important ripple effects for the way the 
public classifies legal cases and gauges the priorities of the pro-
cedures that resolve those cases. 
B. RELATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The concept of relationality refers to the degree to which 
people evaluate their own behaviors, and the behaviors of those 
with whom they interact, in the context of their relationships 
with others.85 Put simply, an individual’s appraisals of another’s 
 
in the Political Order of Conflict-Torn Spaces (London Sch. of Econ. & Political 
Sci., Working Paper No. 04, 2015); then citing Tyler, supra note 12, at 325; and 
then citing Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 123, 126–27 (2008)). For a succinct summary, see Justin Sevier, Legitimizing 
Character Evidence, 68 EMORY L.J. 441, 456–57 (2019). 
 83. Sevier, supra note 79, at 1171 (citing Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of 
Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 830 (1989) (conducting experiments and finding that the neutrality 
of the decision-making process, trust in the decision maker, and the information 
conveyed to an individual regarding her social standing influence perceptions 
of governmental legitimacy)). Other researchers have replicated these effects. 
Id. at 1171 n.76 (citing Heather J. Smith et al., The Self-Relevant Implications 
of the Group-Value Model: Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment Qual-
ity, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 470 (1998); Fatima H. Sousa & Jorge 
Vala, Relational Justice in Organizations: The Group-Value Model and Support 
for Change, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 99 (2002)). 
 84. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14, at 1097.  
 85. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21 (categorizing relational models as 
those that “focus on relationship issues, especially perceptions of the relation-
ship between the authority and those subject to his or her decision”); see also 
Ian Tucker, Psychology as Space: Embodied Relationality, 5 SOC. & PERSONAL-
ITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 231, 231–38 (2011) (borrowing from notions of biological 
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attitudes and behaviors do not occur in a vacuum; people ac-
tively—both consciously and outside of conscious awareness—
seek to understand the relational context in which behavior oc-
curs.86 Although psychologists disagree regarding how success-
fully people are able to integrate contextual factors into their ap-
praisal of an individual’s behavior, there is little disagreement 
that these relational calculations occur.87 Indeed, empirical re-
search suggests that people are especially sensitive to relational 
equities and inequities in their interactions with others in their 
social environment, including authority figures.88 Social scien-
tists argue that relationality in the context of equity and fairness 
is a guiding principle for how people view actors in their social 
environment.89 Others further argue that these judgments ex-
tend to people’s willingness to legitimize the institutions that 
govern them.90 Although several theories have been proffered for 
understanding how individuals evaluate intergroup relations,91 
 
“space” and reconceptualizing areas of social psychology as instantiations of the 
relational “space” between individuals). 
 86. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21. 
 87. Compare Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: 
Distortions in the Attribution Process, in ADVANCED EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 173, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 10th ed. 1977) (discussing the 
“fundamental attribution error” in which people insufficiently adjust for contex-
tual factors that contribute to behavior), with Bill D. Bell & Gary G. Stanfield, 
An Interactionist Appraisal of Impression Formation: The “Central Trait” Hy-
pothesis Revisited, 9 KAN. J. SOC. 55, 63 (1973) (stating the conditions under 
which people are more likely to take relational considerations into account when 
evaluating human behavior). For a succinct review of this issue, see Sevier, su-
pra note 82, at 458–64. 
 88. Psychologists Kirschner & Martin have summed up this research this 
way: “Indeed, a long line of Anglo-American and Continental thinkers have held 
that our social relations with others have primacy with respect to our psycho-
logical existence, being an indispensably necessary source for our thinking 
about the world and ourselves.” THE SOCIOCULTURAL TURN IN PSYCHOLOGY: 
THE CONTEXTUAL EMERGENCE OF MIND AND SELF 3 (Suzanne R. Kirschner & 
Jack Martin eds., 2010). 
 89. See, e.g., Tom Tyler at al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Pro-
cedures Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value 
Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 913, 914–15 (1996) (discussing the 
“group-value model” of social interaction and explaining the psychological sig-
nals sent to group members when they deem interactions as fair). 
 90. See Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14 at 1117–30 (testing two models of 
legitimacy and finding support for a model of legitimacy based on the social sig-
nals produced by a tribunal’s procedures). 
 91. The most well-known of the early theories of intergroup relations was 
social exchange theory, which posits that people view their societal interactions 
as a means through which they can maximize the social and economic benefits 
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the dominant explanation stems from social identity theory in 
social psychology.92 
Social identity theory posits that an individual’s relevant so-
cial group has a direct, measurable impact on an individual’s 
self-concept and her assessments of others in her social environ-
ment.93 Social identity theorists hypothesize that social relation-
ships primarily are governed not by what is the most economi-
cally beneficial outcome to the parties, but instead by what will 
lead to the best psychological self-concept for partners to the ex-
change.94 This self-concept is often governed by the individual’s 
group membership.95 At the heart of social identity theory is the 
notion that people are intrinsically motivated, both consciously 
and unconsciously, to achieve a state of positive self-distinctive-
ness, or positive self-identity.96 They typically judge themselves 
and others through a series of social comparisons between them-
selves and a target actor in their environment.97 To the extent 
 
while minimizing losses and costs. See, e.g., Karen S. Cook & Richard M. Emer-
son, Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 
721 (1978); see also George C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. 
SOC. 597 (1958). In studies that test the tenets of social exchange theory, re-
searchers focus on variables such as the individual’s degree of self-interest, de-
gree of interdependence, and cognitive appraisals of gains and losses. For a re-
view, see Edward J. Lawler & Shane R. Thye, Bringing Emotion into Social 
Exchange Theory, 25 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 217 (1999). One of the principal 
criticisms of traditional social exchange theory is that it characterizes social in-
teractions and personal dynamics in a manner that is artificially transactional. 
See Edward J. Lawler, An Affect Theory of Social Exchange, 107 AM. J. SOCIOL-
OGY 321 (2001). 
 92. See MICHAEL A. HOGG & DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES 
(1988); ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1978). 
 93. John C. Turner & Penelope J. Oakes, The Significance of the Social 
Identity Concept for Social Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interac-
tionism and Social Influence, 25 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 240–41 (1986). 
Self-identity is based on an individual’s membership in various social groups; 
thus a person possesses multiple identities that are adopted and used based on 
situational factors. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21. 
 95. Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup 
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33–47 (W.G. 
Austin & S. Worchel eds., 1979). 
 96. See generally S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH 26–56 (1st ed. 2001). 
 97. Social comparison theory, a highly influential concept in social psychol-
ogy, was first introduced by Leon Festinger in 1954. The theory centers on the 
belief that social beings seek to gain information bearing on their self-valua-
tions. Festinger hypothesized that individuals do so by explicitly or implicitly 
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that a person’s self-perception is linked to her social identity 
among others in her environment, one hypothesis for explaining 
how individuals achieve positive self-distinctiveness suggests a 
direct link between positive self-distinctiveness and positive self-
esteem, such that the nature of a person’s group status in the 
relevant social hierarchy, as well as her status within that social 
group, can positively and negatively affect the polarity of her so-
cial identity.98  
Thus, social identity models predict that interactions that 
leave people believing that they are not valued within their so-
cial group, or that the social group with which they identify is 
not valued by a decision maker, will affect their perceptions of 
the fairness and value of that social interaction.99 Although this 
model of intergroup interaction is not orthogonal to the economic 
outcomes that people receive during their exchange transactions 
with others, the social identity model focuses primarily on the 
subjective psychological states of the actors to the exchange.100 
In so doing, this model of intergroup relations moves away from 
purely “cold” cognitive calculations of expected utility and fo-
cuses on “warmer” cognition associated with, among other psy-
chological constructs, dignity and respect.101  
Perhaps most importantly, social identity theory explicitly 
accepts as its premise for societal interaction that group mem-
bers consistently evaluate interactions with others in their envi-
ronment through the lens of relationality. This has several im-
plications for the continuing applicability of Thibaut and 
Walker’s A Theory of Procedure. As the next sections demon-
strate, relationality manifests itself (1) in the concept of inter-
subjectivity with respect to the classification of legal conflicts, 
and (2) in the concept of the group-value model with respect to 
the classification of legal procedures. Under this framework, we 
can reimagine Thibaut and Walker’s taxonomy of cases and pro-
cedures as placing different types of disputes and procedures on 
a continuum based on the extent to which these disputes and 
 
comparing themselves to others in their environment to reduce uncertainty 
about their own social standing and to receive information relevant to their self-
concept. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. 
REL. 117 (1954). Social comparison processes have complex consequences for 
ethnocentrism, in-group favoritism, stereotyping, and conformity behaviors. Id. 
 98. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 95, at 33–47. 
 99. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21. 
 100. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 95, at 33–47. 
 101. For a review, see HOGG & ABRAMS, supra note 92. 
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procedures foster—or decline to foster—the use of relational 
comparisons by the public. 
1. The Relationality of Conflicts 
In the context of the judgments we make about others in our 
environment, the concept of relationality can be traced to Ger-
man philosopher Martin Heidegger’s “hermeneutic circle.”102 
Heidegger argued, in the context of textual interpretation, that 
neither the whole of an ancient text nor any individual part can 
be understood without reference to the other.103 Thus, pure tex-
tual interpretation is impossible without situating the text in its 
literary, historical, or cultural context.104 
This hermeneutic approach to relationality was expanded 
upon most famously by sociologist Max Weber105 and manifests 
itself in the psychological concept of intersubjectivity. Intersub-
jectivity has been conceptualized in different ways,106 but it is 
widely understood as the manner in which we explain and pre-
dict others’ behavior by imagining what our mental states would 
be, and how we would behave, if we were in their situation.107 
More specifically, we simulate the target’s mental states to un-
derstand the cause of the observed behavior, and then use the 
simulated mental states as input for our decision-making.108 We 
then take the resulting conclusion and attribute it to the tar-
get.109 
 
 102. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 352 (John Macquarrie & Ed-
ward Robinson trans., Harper & Row 1962). 
 103. Id. But cf. Georgia Warnke, The Hermeneutic Circle Versus Dialogue, 
65 REV. METAPHYSICS 91 (2011) (critiquing the concept). 
 104. Warnke, supra note 103. 
 105. See MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 
(1922). 
 106. For examples of different approaches, see EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, SOCIAL 
MINDSCAPES: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SOCIOLOGY (1997) (discussing in-
tersubjectivity in the context of “thought communities”); Hanne De Jaegher et 
al., Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?, 14 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCI. 441 (2010) (discussing an “interactive turn in social cognition research”); 
Shannon Spaulding, Introduction to Debates on Social Cognition, 11 PHENOME-
NOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 431 (2012) (discussing a “theory theory” approach to 
intersubjectivity). 
 107. Spaulding, supra note 106, at 433. For a neuroscientific view of inter-
subjectivity, see Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia, What Is So Special 
About Embodied Simulation?, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 512 (2011). 
 108. Gallese & Sinigaglia, supra note 107. 
 109. Id. 
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Applying these principles to the classification of human con-
flicts sheds light on the limitations of Thibaut and Walker’s ap-
proach. Their claim that all questions of science comprise cogni-
tive conflicts and all legal questions comprise conflicts of interest 
fails to meaningfully distinguish between different types of legal 
disputes. For example, a classic “whodunit” murder trial at-
tempts to resolve the same primary question as a purely scien-
tific inquiry: the unbiased development of facts. In neither 
case—either the temperature at which dry ice sublimates or the 
identity of an assault victim’s attacker—does the ultimate deter-
mination rest on a subjective, relational judgment by the fact 
finder; rather, the primary question is the search for objective 
truth. Thus, although Thibaut and Walker may be correct that 
even a “whodunit” conflict creates a zero-sum game between the 
government and the defendant in a manner that normally is not 
true with respect to adversaries in a scientific dispute,110 the 
non-relational question at the heart of both disputes is similar. 
In contrast, other cases require a greater degree of intersub-
jectivity, and therefore are more relational. For example, civil 
and criminal fact finders frequently must determine whether a 
defendant’s admitted actions meet a psychologically subjective 
standard, such as the actions of a reasonably prudent person un-
der the circumstances surrounding the conflict.111 Of course, the 
underlying fact finding is still important, insofar as the tribunal 
must have information regarding the actions that the defendant 
took that bear on the question of reasonableness. But these cases 
require the tribunal to make the type of relational comparisons 
that form the basis of social identity theory and intersubjectivity. 
The fact finder must decide, in reference to the abstract, reason-
able person—and in practice, in reference to one’s idealized self-
image112—whether the target’s behavior conformed to in-group 
norms, such that the target is relieved of legal responsibility for 
 
 110. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 544 (“Criminal litigation also 
involves a conflict of interest, because the prosecutor (as surrogate for society) 
and the defendant seek incompatible outcomes.”). 
 111. Although the inquiry as a formal legal matter is framed as an objective 
one, reasonable people can and frequently do differ on whether civil or criminal 
defendants meet the standard. This suggests that, at least from a psychological 
perspective, the determination is more subjective than formal legal doctrines 
imply. 
 112. See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener et al., Social Analytic Investigation of Hos-
tile Work Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 263 (1995) (examining the processes by which jurors evaluate the 
reasonable person standard in tort law). 
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the consequences of her actions. As in questions of intersubjec-
tivity and social identity theory outside the legal context, these 
comparisons frequently involve questions of equity and fair-
ness113—reframed in legal terms: justice.114 
Thus, we can reformulate Thibaut and Walker’s dichotomy 
of scientific cognitive conflicts and legal conflicts of interest 
along a relationality continuum, whereby non-relational quests 
for objective facts fall along the left side of the continuum and 
relational conflicts that invite social comparison fall along the 
right side. A simplified sketch of this continuum appears in Fig-
ure 2 below.115 
 
Figure 2. Relationality Continuum of Legal Conflicts. 
Interestingly, if relationality is a guiding principle by which 
the public evaluates the objectives of different legal disputes, an-
other hypothesis emerges. We could extend this theory not just 
to different types of cases—as Thibaut and Walker did—but also 
to different phases of a trial. Specifically, the public may perceive 
the liability phase of a trial as meaningfully different from the 
punishment phase with respect to the degree of relationality 
that is present. The liability phase—whether it is a whodunit 
murder trial or a civil negligence trial—requires the fact finder 
to reach a binary decision: either guilty or not guilty (or liable or 
non-liable in the civil context). In contrast, the punishment 
phase requires the tribunal to make a more subjective judgment: 
the extent of the restitution that would make the plaintiff or so-
ciety whole. Scholars have noted that these judgments implicitly 
involve notions of fairness, as opposed to “accuracy,”116 and these 
 
 113. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 83. 
 114. See Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14, at 1095. 
 115. For a robust discussion of this relationality continuum, see infra notes 
125–30 and accompanying text. 
 116. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and 
the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003) (discussing the 
concept in the context of victim impact statements). 
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fairness judgments are often reached after hearing from wit-
nesses who explain the harm the defendant inflicted on the vic-
tim in the context of the relationship between the witness and 
the victim.117 This Article therefore predicts that the public per-
ceives the liability phase of a trial as primarily concerned with 
questions of truth, whereas the public perceives the punishment 
phase as focusing on justice. 
2. The Relationality of Procedures 
This Article applies the relationality framework to reimag-
ine Thibaut and Walker’s classification of decision-making pro-
cedures. In this domain, relationality manifests itself in the con-
cept of the group-value model,118 first proposed by legal 
psychologist Tom R. Tyler, which distinguishes among conflict 
resolution procedures that have autocratic elements and those 
that have adversarial elements. 
Initially, social science research on the public’s perceptions 
of legal dispute resolution procedures focused solely on the out-
comes that the procedures produced.119 Later research, however, 
suggested that the public’s attitudes toward legal tribunals were 
more complex; they also depended on the process by which those 
decisions were reached.120 This phenomenon, termed “proce-
dural justice,” posits that people’s perceptions of the justice af-
forded to them in a social transaction are shaped in part by their 
subjective evaluations of the fairness of the procedures used to 
allocate resources.121 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. LIND & TYLER, supra note 70. 
 119. This phenomenon is termed “distributive justice.” See John T. Jost & 
Aaron C. Kay, Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); see also J. Stacy 
Adams, Inequality in Social Exchange, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 267–99 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965). 
 120. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15; see also LIND & TYLER, supra 
note 70. 
 121. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: 
Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
72 (1985); Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land Use De-
cisions: Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 538, 541 (2010) (“[P]eople’s reactions to their experiences with legal au-
thorities are strongly shaped by their subjective evaluations of the justice of the 
procedures used to resolve their case.”). The phenomenon has been demon-
strated in a vast array of contexts, including legal adjudication, alternative dis-
pute resolution, interactions with the police, the workplace, and in the family. 
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The dominant model for explaining the effect of the decision-
making process on an institution’s perceived legitimacy is rooted 
in social identity theory. The group-value model asserts that le-
gal procedures provide individuals with important information 
regarding (1) the status of their social group within the social 
hierarchy; and (2) their individual standing within the social hi-
erarchy of the group with which they identify.122 The group-
value model predicts that specific factors will influence people’s 
perceptions of their self-identity and self-distinctiveness as a re-
sult of their interaction with a legal procedure: the amount of 
voice they have in the interaction, the amount of control they 
have over the procedure used to allocate resources, the level of 
respect they receive from the decision maker, and the degree of 
bias the resource allocator displays.123 Perhaps because they are 
so important to an individual’s social identity, social scientists 
have found that the relational signals inherent in the process by 
 
See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Ne-
gotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 
33 L. & SOC. INEQ. 473 (2008); Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural 
Justice in Resolving Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Preven-
tion, 21 L. & POL’Y 101 (1999); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate 
Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 AD-
MIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citi-
zens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Ef-
ficiency, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee 
Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regu-
latory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Fol-
ger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with Citizen-Police 
Encounters, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281 (1980). For a review, see 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011). 
 122. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 80. 
 123. See Tyler, supra note 83; Tyler & Lind, supra note 21. Notably, people 
value these constructs when the stakes of the distribution are either high or 
low, and they value their ability to voice their opinion to the decision maker 
even when they are explicitly told that doing so will not affect the distribution 
of resources. See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVAL-
UATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
(RAND Corp. ed., 1990); Tyler et al., supra note 121; see also E. Allan Lind et 
al., Decision Control and Process Control Effects on Procedural Fairness Judg-
ments, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 338 (1983). 
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which a legal decision is reached are often stronger than the out-
come itself in determining the degree to which the public confers 
legitimacy onto a decision making tribunal.124 
An application of these principles to Thibaut and Walker’s 
taxonomy of decision-making procedures leads to similar conclu-
sions about different legal procedures but through a different 
psychological pathway. Thibaut and Walker classified proce-
dures according to the degree of decision and process control that 
the procedures afford litigants.125 When evaluating procedures 
through the lens of relationality, however, we can create a rela-
tionality continuum driven by notions of (1) the disputants’ per-
ceptions of the degree of voice they have in the proceeding, and 
(2) the degree of respect they feel the procedure affords them, 
from the perspective of the group-value model.  
Inquisitorial procedures provide a single selection strategy 
for information processing on the part of the tribunal, but at a 
significant cost: potentially lowered perceptions of voice and re-
spect from the disputants.126 We would therefore expect proce-
dures with inquisitorial elements—such as a single inquisitor or 
panel of investigators that decide the dispute’s outcome—to fall 
on the left side of the relationality spectrum. In contrast, proce-
dures with greater adversarial elements—for example, that al-
low the parties to investigate the dispute, call their own wit-
nesses, and cross-examine other parties’ evidence with minimal 
intrusion from the tribunal—are likely to result in greater per-
ceptions of voice and respect from disputants.127 
We would therefore expect procedures with these elements, 
including many alternative dispute resolution procedures,128 to 
 
 124. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 121, at 132 (“[T]his research 
provided robust empirical evidence that individuals care deeply about the fair-
ness of the process by which decisions are made, apart from considerations 
about the outcome of the decision.”). 
 125. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 546. 
 126. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 80. 
 127. See Sevier, supra note 38. 
 128. Alternative dispute resolution procedures allow litigants to reach 
agreement and to resolve conflicts in a setting that is less resource intensive 
than formal litigation. Such procedures include (1) arbitration, in which a cen-
tral decision maker arbitrates the dispute, but participants are not constrained 
to the formal rules of evidentiary and civil procedure; and (2) mediation, in 
which the decision of the mediator does not bind litigants unless they choose to 
be bound. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, ADR & THE LAW: A REPORT OF 
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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appear on the right side of the spectrum. A figure that captures 
this continuum appears as Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3. Relationality Continuum of Dispute Resolution 
Procedures. 
 
This continuum allows us to make predictions regarding 
how the public will perceive the priorities of different conflict 
resolution procedures. Research on the group-value model sug-
gests that increasing the degree to which disputants feel that 
they have been heard by the tribunal in a respectful manner in-
creases their perceptions of the fairness and equity of the pro-
ceeding.129 This suggests that the public will perceive procedures 
with adversarial features as prioritizing the justice objective of 
conflict resolution. In contrast, vesting the gathering and pre-
senting of evidence in the neutral investigatory fact finder 
should lead to lowered perceptions of the fairness and equity of 
the proceeding, albeit with an increase in public perceptions that 
the fact finder will uncover the “true” facts of the dispute.130 
Thus, procedures with inquisitorial features are likely to be per-
ceived as prioritizing the truth objective of conflict resolution. 
C. SYNTHESIS 
The psychological research on relationality allows us to 
draw broader conclusions about the popular legitimacy of legal 
institutions. Recall that legitimacy is conferred on governing in-
stitutions when the values that the institutions embody comport 
 
JOURNAL AND THE FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL (1997) (discussing alterna-
tive dispute resolution procedures in different areas of law). 
 129. See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note 70 (discussing how people’s 
judgments of procedures and social processes are influenced by the form of social 
interaction). 
 130. See Sevier, supra note 38, at 216 (suggesting people exposed to an in-
quisitional procedure perceived it as producing more truth than justice). 
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with the values of the citizenry.131 Applying that principle, the 
public should be most willing to legitimize legal tribunals when 
the priorities of the procedures by which they resolve disputes 
align with the perceived objectives of the underlying conflict. 
Thus, Thibaut and Walker’s theory misses relational nuances 
that underlie different legal disputes. Rather than assuming 
that all legal disputes will be legitimized if they are decided ad-
versarially, the relationality research suggests a more complex 
set of preferences from the public. The public should be substan-
tially more willing to legitimize disputes high in relationality 
(the characteristic “conflicts of interest” that Thibaut and 
Walker envision) if they are resolved by adversarial means, 
which prioritize the just allocation of resources. But the public 
also may be willing to legitimize truth-seeking legal disputes, 
which are low in relationality, when they are decided under in-
quisitorial means. This Article tests these hypotheses in a series 
of three original psychology experiments. 
III.  THREE EXPERIMENTS   
This Article reports the results from three original experi-
ments that: (1) empirically test the tenets of Thibaut and 
Walker’s A Theory of Procedure; and (2) expand upon those find-
ings to examine litigant preferences for the design of legitimate 
legal institutions. Specifically, these experiments examine 
whether litigants actually conceive of different cases—and 
phases of a case—as associated with different conflict resolution 
objectives; whether different procedures for resolving those dis-
putes prioritize different objectives; and, most importantly, 
whether the alignment of the priorities of legal procedures with 
the perceived objective of the dispute results in a legal tribunal’s 
increased institutional legitimacy. 
These propositions are tested in three parts. Study 1 exam-
ines how people perceive cases that differ in relationality (that 
is, “cognitive conflict” cases compared to “conflict of interest” 
cases), as well as whether they perceive differences in the objec-
tives of the liability and punishment phases of a trial. Study 2 
examines the objectives that people believe are served by adver-
sarial and inquisitorial dispute resolution procedures. Study 3 
then examines how people’s preferences for these procedures dif-
fer as a function of different case types and trial phases. 
 
 131. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing the im-
portance of legitimacy to governing institutions). 
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A. STUDY 1: CONFLICT OBJECTIVES 
The first study in this series explores whether non-lawyers 
perceive different types of legal cases as concerned with different 
dispute-resolution objectives. Participants read a vignette in 
which they were asked to imagine themselves as spectators at a 
local trial. The study contained two independent variables. First, 
I manipulated the type of case to which the participants were 
exposed, such that they read about a non-relational “whodunit” 
case (that is, a “cognitive conflict”) or a relational “conflict of in-
terest” case. Second, I manipulated the phase of the trial in 
which the case appeared: either at the liability phase or at the 
punishment phase. I measured participants’ views of the goals 
that were effectuated by the legal proceeding that they read—
specifically, the degree to which the proceeding was concerned 
with “truth” or “justice”—and collected demographic information 
from them. 
If participants perceive that different types of legal proceed-
ings are associated with different psychological objectives, as 
Thibaut and Walker suggest,132 and if those differences are a 
function of relationality, we would expect two results to follow. 
First, participants should perceive the low-relationality conflict 
as primarily concerned with establishing factual truth. Con-
versely, participants should perceive the more relational, “con-
flict of interest” case as primarily concerned with questions of 
justice and fairness.  
Second, extending Thibaut and Walker’s theory to the phase 
of the proceeding, we would expect that participants perceive the 
liability phase of a trial (regardless of the type of case) as more 
concerned with establishing factual truth, whereas the punish-
ment phase as concerned primarily with questions of justice and 
fairness. 
1. Participants 
Three hundred American participants were recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online participation ser-
vice, and paid $1.00 for their participation in this study. Partic-
ipants were 48% female, averaged 37.63 years of age (with a SD 
of 10.76), and ranged from 21 to 73 years old. Fifty-eight percent 
of the sample had completed at least a college degree, and the 
median income of the sample was between $40,000 and $49,999. 
 
 132. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 565–66 (concluding their theory of 
procedure). 
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Thirty-seven percent of participants identified as politically lib-
eral, 30% of participants identified as politically moderate, and 
23% of participants identified as conservative. A complete de-
scription of the sample for this study, as well as the two studies 
that follow, appears in Table 1. 
2. Procedure and Measures 
Participants were randomly assigned to (1) one type of case, 
either high or low in relationality; and (2) one phase of the case, 
either liability or punishment, in a “factorial design.”133 Partici-
pants were told that the researchers were interested in their 
opinions regarding different types of legal disputes. After provid-
ing their informed consent to participate in the study, they read 
about a hypothetical case.  
  
 
 133. A factorial design is an experiment whose design consists of two or more 
variables (or “factors”), each with discrete possible values or “levels,” and whose 
experimental units take on all possible combinations of these levels across all 
factors. In a “between subjects” design, such as the design of Study 1, each par-
ticipant is randomly exposed to one level of each variable and is not exposed to 
the others. See ANDY FIELD, DISCOVERING STATISTICS USING IBM SPSS STATIS-
TICS 508–09 (4th ed. 2013) (explaining the meaning and types of factorial de-
sign). 
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Table 1. Demographic Information (Studies 1, 2, and 3). 
 Percentages (N) 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Age    
< 30 24.00 (72) 26.30 (52) 21.00 (71) 
30–39 41.00 (123) 45.50 (90) 38.50 (130) 
40–49 21.00 (63) 14.60 (29) 20.70 (70) 
50–59 07.70 (23) 08.10 (16) 12.70 (43) 
60–78 06.30 (19) 05.50 (11) 07.10 (24) 
    
Gender    
Male 48.00 (144) 61.60 (122) 43.90 (148) 
Female 51.00 (153) 37.90 (75) 54.90 (185) 
    
Race    
Caucasian 80.30 (240) 78.70 (155) 78.00 (262) 
African-American 07.30 (22) 09.60 (19) 08.00 (27) 
Hispanic 06.00 (18) 04.60 (09) 06.80 (23) 
Asian/Pacific Is-
lander 
03.30 (10) 05.60 (11) 05.70 (19) 
Other 03.00 (09) 01.50 (03) 01.50 (05) 
    
Education    
High School 13.10 (39) 14.60 (29) 10.10 (34) 
Some College 28.30 (84) 26.30 (52) 29.70 (100) 
College 49.20 (146) 51.00 (101) 43.60 (147) 
Master’s 08.40 (25) 06.10 (12) 12.80 (43) 
Ph.D. or Profes-
sional 
01.00 (03) 02.00 (04) 03.90 (13) 
    
Political Affiliation    
Very Conservative 07.30 (22) 10.70 (21) 03.60 (12) 
Conservative 15.70 (47) 20.80 (41) 19.90 (67) 
Moderate 29.70 (89) 23.90 (47) 29.70 (100) 
Liberal 29.70 (89) 28.40 (56) 28.20 (95) 
Very Liberal 17.00 (51) 15.70 (31) 18.10 (61) 
    
Income    
Less than $30,000 24.70 (74) 24.20 (48) 21.10 (71) 
$30,000 - $49,000 27.10 (81) 29.30 (58) 26.90 (91) 
$50,000 - $69,000 23.40 (70) 20.70 (41) 21.90 (74) 
$70,000 or greater 24.70 (74) 26.30 (52) 30.20 (102) 
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The subject of the case was the same across all four experi-
mental conditions. The defendant was accused of striking and 
severely injuring a small child with his vehicle on a rainy night 
on a dimly lit road. In each experimental condition, participants 
were told that, in addition to the police report of the accident, the 
court would receive evidence of the child’s medical expenses and 
suffering as well as testimony from the child’s family members 
who witnessed the accident and its aftermath. 
The focus of the dispute between the parties was the subject 
of the case type manipulation. For half of the participants, who 
were in the low-relationality condition, the parties did not dis-
pute that negligent driving had caused the injury to the child. 
They did dispute, however, that the defendant had been the per-
son driving the vehicle. In this experimental condition, the focus 
of the case was the factual determination of the driver’s identity. 
For the remaining participants in the high-relationality con-
dition, the focus of the case differed. The defendant did not dis-
pute that he drove the vehicle that injured the child. He did dis-
pute, however, that he had been driving negligently. He argued 
that, despite the care that he exercised while driving on that 
rainy night, the accident could not have been avoided. Thus, the 
jury’s factual determinations in this condition would be subordi-
nate to the relational question of whether his actions conformed 
to societal norms: whether he exercised the care that an ordinary 
person in the community would have exercised, which would vi-
tiate his liability. 
The legal proceeding in which the case unfolded was also 
manipulated. Half of the participants encountered the case in 
the context of the liability phase, in which the fact finder deter-
mines whether the defendant is subject to punishment for the 
act of which he is accused. In this experimental condition, par-
ticipants were told that the evidence collected by the court would 
be used for this purpose—to determine whether the defendant 
meets the legal requirements for punishment. 
The remaining participants encountered the case in the con-
text of the punishment phase. Here, participants were told that 
the evidence was collected by the court for a different purpose. 
Participants who were also in the low-relationality “case type” 
condition were told here that the evidence was collected to deter-
mine the amount of restitution that would be paid to the family 
on account of the defendant’s conduct. Participants who were 
also in the high-relationality “case type” condition were told that 
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the evidence was collected to determine the defendant’s sen-
tence—the amount of time he should be incarcerated for causing 
the accident. The distinctions between the experimental condi-
tions are highlighted in Table 2. 
After participants completed attention and comprehension 
checks, they completed the dependent measures of the study.134 
Five items measured the degree to which the proceeding to 
which participants were exposed was concerned with truth. 
These items included the following: (1) “How much do you think 
the goal of this proceeding is to reach an accurate decision?”; (2) 
“How much do you think the goal of the proceeding is to uncover 
the true facts?”; (3) “How much do you think the goal of the pro-
ceeding was to reveal the correct information that the court 
needs to make a decision?”; (4) “How likely do you think it is that 
the goal of the proceeding is to reach the right factual decision?”; 
and (5) “How much faith do you have that the goal of this pro-
ceeding is to resolve the dispute correctly on its facts?” 
  
 
 134. These questions measure the degree of perceived “truth” and “justice” 
produced by different legal procedures on seven-point Likert scales. The items 
were modified to gauge participants’ sense of the truth and justice produced by 
the legal proceedings themselves, to which participants were randomly as-
signed. These modifications resulted in eleven items, which were randomized.  
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Table 2. Summary of Experimental Manipulations 
(Study 1). 
 Trial Phase 
Case Type Liability Punishment 
Low-Relationality (underly-
ing factual questions pre-
dominate) 
Participants were told that 
the perpetrator’s action was 
negligent, but that the de-
fendant disputes that he was 
the perpetrator.  
The court must collect evi-
dence (in the form of wit-
nesses and documents) to de-
termine whether the 
defendant in fact struck the 
victim. 
Participants were told that 
the court is not determining 
whether the defendant drove 
the vehicle that struck the vic-
tim.  
The court instead must de-
termine how much the de-
fendant owes in restitution 
for the injury he inflicted. 
The court must collect evi-
dence (in the form of wit-
nesses and documents) to de-
termine just how much the 
victim’s family had to spend 
to recover from the injuries. 
The court may also deter-
mine if the victim is owed 
money for pain and suffering. 
High-Relationality (underly-
ing factual questions subor-
dinate to distributive fairness 
concerns) 
Participants were told that 
the perpetrator does not dis-
pute that he struck the victim.  
The court must determine 
whether the level of caution 
that the defendant exhibited 
(as determined by witnesses 
and documents) was equal to 
what an “ordinary prudent 
person” in the community 
would have exhibited under 
the circumstances. 
Participants were told that 
the court is not determining 
whether the defendant drove 
the vehicle that struck the vic-
tim.  
The court instead must de-
termine how much time in 
jail the defendant deserves 
for injuring the victim. The 
court must collect evidence 
(in the form of witnesses and 
documents) and apply it to 
legal guidelines to decide 
how much time in jail the de-
fendant will receive. 
 
 
Six items measured the degree to which the proceeding was 
concerned primarily with justice. These items included: (1) “How 
much do you think the goal of the proceeding is about rendering 
a decision that is fair?”; (2) “How much do you believe that being 
treated fairly by the courts is the major focus of this proceed-
ing?”; (3) “How much is the fair treatment of people the main 
focus of this proceeding?”; (4) “How much do you agree that the 
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purpose of this proceeding is to reach a fair conclusion?”;  
(5) “How much do you think that treating the parties fairly is the 
point of this proceeding?”; and (6) “How much would you agree 
that most people who go through this proceeding would say that 
the point is to reach a fair decision?” 
Participants then answered a series of demographic ques-
tions before being debriefed. Participants self-reported their age, 
gender, race, ethnicity, income, and political orientation. They 
also answered whether they had previous experience with the 
courts and, if so, in what capacity. 
3. Results 
Results are reported in two parts. First, I conducted a con-
firmatory factor analysis (CFA)135 on the measures of truth and 
justice in this study to examine their convergent and discrimi-
nant validity.136 Second, I examined participants’ perceptions of 
the truth and justice produced by different types of cases and 
different trial phases. 
 
 135. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a special form of factor analysis, 
most commonly used in social science research. It is used to test whether 
measures of a psychological construct are consistent with a researcher’s under-
standing of the nature of that construct (or “factor”), and the objective of con-
firmatory factor analysis therefore is to test whether the data fit the re-
searcher’s hypothesized measurement model. In a confirmatory factor analysis, 
the researcher first develops a hypothesis about what factors she believes are 
underlying the measures used in the study and may impose constraints on the 
model based on these a priori hypotheses. For example, if it is posited that there 
are two factors accounting for the covariance in the measures, and that these 
factors are unrelated to one another, the researcher can create a model where 
the correlation between factor A and factor B is constrained to zero. “Model fit 
measures” could then be obtained to assess how well the proposed model cap-
tured the covariance between all the items or measures in the model. If the con-
straints the researcher has imposed on the model are inconsistent with the sam-
ple data, then the results of statistical tests of model fit will indicate a poor fit, 
and the model will be rejected. If the constraints are satisfactory and consistent 
with the sample data, the results of statistical tests of model fit will indicate a 
good fit. See generally TIMOTHY A. BROWN, CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
FOR APPLIED RESEARCH (2d ed. 2015) (explaining the principles and methods 
involved in the confirmatory factor analysis technique). 
 136. Convergent and discriminant validity are subtypes of construct valid-
ity. The former measures the degree that constructs that should be related to 
each other are, in fact, observed to be related to each other; the latter measures 
whether constructs that should not be related to each other are, in fact, observed 
to not be related to each other. See generally Donald T. Campbell & Donald W. 
Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod 
Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81 (1959) (explaining these statistical concepts). 
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a. Preliminary Analysis: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
I conducted the CFA using the Lavaan package from R Sta-
tistical Software.137 Based on past research,138 I hypothesized a 
two-factor model to be confirmed by the CFA. The theorized 
model contained the five truth items, which composed one factor 
(truth), and six justice items, which composed a second factor 
(justice).139 Figure 4 below illustrates the relationship between 
the two factors, and Table 3 provides the measurements of model 
fit. 
As shown in Table 3, the metrics for measuring the fit of the 
hypothesized model indicate good fit between the theorized 
model and the data.140 Table 3 also provides standardized pa-
rameter estimates141 and demonstrates that this two-factor so-
lution provides superior fit compared to a one-factor solution, in 
which there is no meaningful difference between the truth and 
 
 137. Yves Rosseel, Lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling, 
48 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1 (2012). An analysis of the data revealed no univariate 
or multivariate outliers. 
 138. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 543; Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14. 
 139. Because the data were normally distributed, I chose a maximum likeli-
hood estimation in evaluating model fit. The truth and justice factors were per-
mitted to be correlated based on prior evidence of a weak to moderate relation-
ship between these dimensions. 
 140. These statistics include the goodness of fit index (GFI), comparative fit 
index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). See gener-
ally REX B. KLINE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF STRUCTURAL EQUATION MOD-
ELING (3d ed. 2011) (introducing different statistics of evaluating model fit). 
Generally, test values for GFI, CFI, and TLI should be close to one, whereas 
values for RMSEA and SRMR should be close to zero. Above 0.95 is considered 
a good fit for CFI and TLI, with 0.90 considered a good fit for GFI (0.95 in some 
cases). See Daire Hooper et al., Structural Equation Modelling: Guidelines for 
Determining Model Fit, 6 ELECTRONIC J. BUS. RES. METHODS 53, 53–55 (2008). 
Below 0.08 is considered an acceptable fit for SRMR, id. at 55, while a RMSEA 
falling between 0.06 and 0.08 indicates a close to good fit. Sengul Cangur & Ilker 
Ercan, Comparison of Model Fit Indices Used in Structural Equation Modeling 
Under Multivariate Normality, 14 J. MOD. APPLIED STAT. METHODS 152, 157 
(2015). 
 141. A standardized parameter estimate is a descriptive estimation—based 
on the sample examined in an experimental study—of the true “value” of the 
phenomena being examined in the population from which the sample is drawn. 
See generally JAMES V. BECK & KENNETH J. ARNOLD, PARAMETER ESTIMATION 
IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 1 (1977) (defining the term and explaining its 
significance). 
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justice items.142 The items that loaded onto the separate factors 
were averaged to form two scales: “Truth Objective” and “Justice 
Objective.”143 
 






 142. Because of the good fit indices, no post hoc modifications were made to 
the two-factor solution, and the residual analysis was satisfactory. See generally 
BROWN, supra note 135 (explaining principles of confirmatory factor analysis). 
 143. Five items, α = 0.91 (Truth); six items, α = 0.92 (Justice). The reliability 
of a psychometric scale is measured by a Cronbach’s alpha statistic ranging from 
0.00 (lowest reliability) to 1.00 (highest reliability), with acceptable reliability 
greater than .80. See Lee J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Struc-
ture of Tests, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 297, 327–28 (1951) (discussing the range of 
“α”). The two scales were weakly and negatively correlated with each other, 
r(298) = -0.11, p = 0.048. 
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Table 3. Fit Statistics for Two-Factor Solution 
 
Estimate 
Absolute Fit Indices  
Model Chi-Square (df = 43) 122.32*** 
Goodness of Fit (GFI) 0.93 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR) 
0.06 
Relative Fit Indices  
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.96 
Non-Centrality-Based Fit Indices  
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.97 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
0.08 




df GFI SRMR TLI RMSEA CFI 
One-
Factor 
1351.33 44 0.43 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.43 
Two-
Factor 
122.33 43 0.93 0.06 0.96 0.08 0.97 
 
b. Main Analysis 
A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was con-
ducted to analyze the data.144 The analysis included (a) two be-
 
 144. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) provides a statistical test of whether 
the means of several groups are equal. ANOVA results are represented by an 
F-statistic, and the sizes of the effects are represented by 2p. Means are denoted 
by the letter “M” and standard deviations are denoted by the letters “SD.” See 
ROBERT LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 168–72 (2d ed. 2016) (ex-
plaining empirical research methodologies and statistical techniques). 
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tween-subjects factors: case type (low-relationality vs. high-rela-
tionality) and trial phase (liability vs. punishment); and (b) one 
within-subjects factor, which captured participants’ judgments 
of the extent to which the legal case was concerned with truth 
and the extent to which it was concerned with justice.145 
To test the hypothesis that people’s perceptions of the objec-
tive of a legal proceeding would differ as a function of the type of 
case and the phase in which the case is situated, I conducted a 2 
(case type) x 2 (phase) x 2 (objective: truth vs. justice) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last variable.146 The analysis re-
vealed an effect of the proceeding’s objective, such that ratings 
of the degree to which the case was concerned with truth147 were 
lower than ratings of the degree to which the case was concerned 
with justice148 on average across all experimental conditions.149 
The analysis also revealed a main effect of the trial phase,150 
such that the composite of participants’ truth and justice ratings 
were lower in the liability phase151 than in the punishment 
phase.152 
 
  Differences are denoted as “statistically significant” in this Article if the 
statistical tests indicate that the likelihood that the difference observed would 
occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05). A differ-
ence is “marginally significant” if the likelihood of seeing such a difference by 
chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies 
and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 
n.117 (2003) (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MUL-
TIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989)). 
  Bivariate correlations range from -1.00 (a perfect negative relationship) 
to +1.00 (a perfect positive relationship). A bivariate correlation of 0.00 indicates 
no relationship. See, e.g., EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 
453–54 (11th ed. 2007) (explaining different kinds of relationships between the 
variables). 
 145. A mixed design experiment consists of at least one “between subjects” 
factor, in which different participants are exposed to different versions of an 
experimental variable, and one “within subjects” factor, in which participants 
are exposed to multiple versions of an experimental variable. See FIELD, supra 
note 133, at 592 (explaining the definition of mixed designs). 
 146. A repeated measures factor, which is part of a mixed subjects design, 
compares multiple responses by the same participant to the experimental stim-
uli. See id. at 544 (providing the definition and examples for repeated-measures 
designs). 
 147. M = 4.80, SD = 1.48. 
 148. M = 5.30, SD = 1.19. 
 149. F(1, 296) = 24.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08. 
 150. F(1, 296) = 6.27, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.02. 
 151. M = 4.91, SD = 1.21. 
 152. M = 5.68, SD = 1.03. 
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Importantly, and as predicted, these main effects were qual-
ified by two significant two-way interactions. First, the analysis 
revealed an interaction between participants’ perceptions of the 
objective of dispute and the type of case under dispute.153 To ex-
plore this interaction, I examined participants’ perceptions of 
truth and justice in low-relationality cases compared to high-re-
lationality cases. Participants rated the objective of low-relation-
ality cases154 as higher in truth than “conflict of interest” 
cases.155 In contrast, they rated the objective of high-relational-
ity cases156 as more concerned with justice than low-relationality 
cases.157 This interaction is illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5. Perceptions of the Objectives of Different Trial 
Proceedings. 
 
 153. F(1, 296) = 21.83, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07. 
 154. M = 5.10, SD = 1.68. 
 155. M = 4.51, SD = 1.48, F(1, 298), p = 0.001, η2p = 0.04. 
 156. M = 5.46, SD = 1.29. 
 157. M = 5.12, SD = 1.01, F(1, 298), p = 0.015, η2p = 0.02. This comparison 
and the comparison with respect to participants’ perceptions of the truth and 
justice objectives of the liability phase were evaluated through a one-way mul-
tivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to control for false positives (Type I 
error). Both an ANOVA and a MANOVA are statistical tests, which produce 
Fisher’s F-statistics, that examine whether the means of different groups are 
statistically different or statistically equal. A MANOVA is a special type of anal-
ysis of variance where multiple dependent variables—which are at least mod-
erately correlated with each other—are analyzed in tandem to reduce the like-
lihood of Type I error. See, e.g., Russell T. Warne, A Primer on Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) for Behavioral Scientists, 19 PRAC. ASSESS-
MENT RES. & EVALUATION 1, 2 (2014) (explaining the definition of MANOVA). 
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Second, the analysis also revealed an interaction between 
participants’ perceptions of the objective of the legal case and the 
trial phase.158 To explore this interaction, I again examined par-
ticipants’ perceptions of truth and justice in the liability phase 
and in the punishment phase. As predicted, participants rated 
the objective of the liability phase159 as more concerned with 
truth than the punishment phase.160 In contrast, participants 
rated the objective of the punishment phase161 as more con-
cerned with justice than the liability phase.162 This two-way in-
teraction is illustrated in Figure 6.163 
 
Figure 6. Perceptions of the Objectives of Different 
Trial Phases. 
4. Discussion 
The results from Study 1 support the view that the public 
perceives that the resolution of relationally-distinct legal dis-
putes involves different psychological objectives. Study 1 yielded 
several findings consistent with Thibaut and Walker’s A Theory 
 
 158. F(1, 296) = 113.90, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28. 
 159. M = 5.46, SD = 1.32. 
 160. M = 4.14, SD = 1.55, F(1, 298) = 63.10, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18. 
 161. M = 5.69, SD = 1.03. 
 162. M = 4.91, SD = 1.21, F(1, 298) = 35.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11. 
 163. Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis also revealed a significant three-
way interaction among case type, legal proceeding, and proceeding purpose, F(1, 
296) = 11.09, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04. An exploration of this interaction revealed 
that the differences between perceptions of low- and high-relationality cases 
was more muted in the punishment phase than in the liability phase. 
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of Procedure. First, I found that the public perceives the pursuit 
of factual truth and the pursuit of relational justice as related 
but distinct psychological objectives in legal dispute resolution. 
Moreover, the public does not classify dispute resolution proce-
dures as monolithically about truth or justice; rather, these ob-
jectives are associated systematically with different types of le-
gal cases and with different phases of a legal case, depending on 
the degree of relationality involved in the dispute. 
In low-relationality cases, participants perceived that the le-
gal decision maker’s primary function is to determine factual 
truth. But in “conflict of interest” cases high in relationality, 
where the court must determine whether a defendant’s conduct 
was objectively reasonable in relation to communal norms, par-
ticipants perceived that the tribunal’s function is to reach a de-
cision that is distributively fair and procedurally just. 
Similarly, the concept of relationality affected participants’ 
perceptions of the objectives of different phases of a trial. Insofar 
as the liability phase is comparatively lower than the punish-
ment phase in relationality, the public views the liability phase 
as concerned more with the creation of factual truth than with 
notions of justice. The converse is true with respect to the pun-
ishment phase, which is higher in relationality. When the court 
is concerned not with the adjudication of guilt or liability, but 
instead with the appropriate sentence, restitution, or damages 
that a litigant must pay, the public views this phase of the trial 
as more concerned with notions of distributive fairness and pro-
cedural justice, and less with establishing factual truth. 
Altogether, this study suggests that the public associates 
different types of legal disputes—and the circumstances under 
which those cases are adjudicated—with different psychological 
values and goals. The next study examines whether different 
methods for resolving legal disputes are perceived as prioritizing 
these goals differently. 
B. STUDY 2: PROCEDURAL PRIORITIES 
The second study in this series seeks to explore whether dif-
ferent conflict resolution procedures prioritize different conflict 
resolution objectives. Study 2 also examines whether the pursuit 
of factual truth and the pursuit of relational justice are both im-
plicated in participants’ willingness to legitimize the decisions of 
legal tribunals. 
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In this study, participants read about a different trial at 
their local courthouse. This time, I manipulated whether the dis-
pute would be resolved pursuant to a relational, adversarial pro-
cedure or a non-relational, inquisitorial procedure. I then meas-
ured participants’ perceptions of the amount of truth and justice 
that they expected to be produced under the procedure to which 
they were exposed, in addition to several other items regarding 
the proceeding, the witnesses and evidence, and the degree to 
which participants would legitimize the tribunal’s ultimate deci-
sion.  
If participants perceive different procedures for resolving le-
gal disputes as prioritizing different psychological values, we 
would predict that participants will (1) perceive the adversarial 
procedure as prioritizing justice more so than the inquisitorial 
procedure; and (2) perceive the inquisitorial procedure as priori-
tizing factual truth more so than the adversarial procedure. 
Moreover, if Thibaut and Walker are correct, we would expect 
that both truth and justice are necessary conditions precedent to 
legitimizing a legal tribunal’s decision. Participants should 
therefore legitimize legal decisions that are reached under either 
procedure, but through different psychological pathways. This 
Section reports the methodology and results of Study 2. 
1. Participants, Procedures, and Measures 
One hundred ninety-eight American participants were re-
cruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online participa-
tion service, and paid $1.00 for their participation in Study 2. 
Participants were 38% female, averaged 37.19 years of age (with 
a SD of 10.62), and ranged from 20 to 78 years old. Fifty-nine 
percent of the sample had completed at least a college degree, 
and the median income of the sample was between $40,000 and 
$49,999. Forty-four percent of participants identified as politi-
cally liberal, 24% of participants identified as politically moder-
ate, and 31% of participants identified as conservative.164 
Participants were told that the researchers were interested 
in their opinions regarding different types of legal dispute reso-
lution procedures. After providing their informed consent to par-
ticipate in the study, they read about a hypothetical legal case.165 
 
 164. For a complete description of the sample for this study, see supra tbl.1. 
 165. The case was adapted from Sevier, supra note 38, at 214–21 (the pilot 
study). 
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The legal case, which was the same for all participants, in-
volved a civil plaintiff suing a drug manufacturer for monetary 
damages. The plaintiff alleged that, after taking the defendant’s 
antibiotic medicine, she became violently ill with severe stomach 
pains and related injuries. The evidence against the defendant 
included testimony from the plaintiff, her family members, and 
her treating physician regarding her alleged injuries; receipts 
proving that she had purchased the defendant’s medication; and 
invoices from the hospital emergency room where she was 
treated. Evidence in the defendant’s favor included pre-market, 
internal reports indicating that the drug was safe and effective. 
Additionally, the court received expert testimony from a biologist 
describing animal studies suggesting a link between the defend-
ant’s product and illnesses similar to the plaintiff ’s injuries. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two legal pro-
cedures to resolve the dispute between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant drug company. For half of the participants, the dispute 
was resolved through adversarial methods. Participants learned 
that each party was allowed to call its own witnesses, and that 
the plaintiff called herself, her family members, her doctors, and 
the expert witness to testify; the defendant primarily called its 
employees to testify. Each party was permitted to ask questions 
of the other party’s witnesses through cross-examination. 
For the remaining participants, the dispute was resolved 
through inquisitorial methods. In this condition, participants 
learned that the judge, not the parties, called all of the witnesses 
and questioned them, including the expert witness. The parties 
were not allowed to meaningfully cross-examine the witnesses, 
although they were allowed to ask minor clarification questions. 
After all participants completed the attention and comprehen-
sion checks, they were asked several questions about their im-
pressions of the trial. 
The dependent measures in this study consisted of items 
covering five topics, which were presented to participants in ran-
dom order. Participants were asked questions related to: (1) the 
credibility of the witnesses,166 (2) the perceived level of proce-
dural justice afforded to the parties (as operationalized by items 
 
 166. Three items related to the perceived credibility of the trial witnesses: 
(a) “Under this procedure, how motivated do you believe the witnesses were to 
give testimony that was no slanted toward one party?”; (b) “Under this proce-
dure, how much do you believe that the witness would testify truthfully?”; and 
(c) “Under this procedure, how much do you think the witnesses’ testimony was 
unbiased?” 
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measuring perceived voice, respect, and control),167 (3) the de-
gree to which the procedure that they were exposed to prioritized 
the truth-finding goal of the courts,168 (4) the degree to which it 
prioritized the overall fairness goal of the courts,169 and (5) the 
degree to which they would legitimize a decision maker that used 
the procedure to which they were exposed.170 The items were 
measured on standard seven-point Likert scales. 
As in Study 1, participants then answered a series of demo-
graphic questions before being debriefed. Specifically, partici-
pants self-reported their age, gender, race, ethnicity, income,  
 
 
 167. Three items measured participants’ perceptions of the procedural jus-
tice afforded by the procedure to which they were exposed: (a) “How much con-
trol does this procedure give parties over the outcome of the dispute?”; (b) “How 
respected by the court do you believe parties would feel when the court uses this 
procedure to resolve the dispute?”; and (c) “How much does this procedure give 
parties the ability to persuade the decision maker of their point of view?” Rather 
than measuring participants’ general impressions of procedural justice, these 
items measured individual components of the construct. Both approaches are 
accepted in the relevant literature. 
 168. Five items measured the extent to which the legal procedure to which 
participants were exposed prioritized truth in fact finding. These items were: 
(a) “How likely it is that a decision reached using this procedure will be accu-
rate?”; (b) “How likely is it under this procedure that a court will uncover the 
true facts?”; (c) “How likely is it that this procedure will reveal the right infor-
mation that the court needs to make a decision?”; (d) “How much confidence 
would you have in a court to make a good factual decision using this procedure?”; 
and (e) “How much faith do you have that a court using this procedure will re-
solve disputes in a way that gets to the truth?” 
 169. Four items measured the extent to which the procedure to which par-
ticipants were exposed prioritized justice. These items were: (a) “In general, I 
can count on courts using this procedure to be just”; (b) “Overall, courts that use 
this procedure treat parties fairly”; (c) “Most people who have their cases de-
cided under this procedure would believe that it is just”; and (d) “Generally, 
people receive fair treatment from courts that use this procedure.” These items 
were adapted from Ambrose and Schminke’s overall fairness scale for organiza-
tional justice. See generally Maureen L. Ambrose & Marshall Schminke, The 
Role of Overall Justice Judgments in Organizational Justice Research: A Test of 
Mediation, 94 J. APPLIED PYSCHOL. 491 (2009) (examining overall justice and 
its relationship with specific justice). 
 170. Finally, five items measured several aspects of the perceived legitimacy 
of the court when it used the procedure to which participants were exposed: (a) 
“How legitimate would you view verdicts that are reached using this proce-
dure?”; (b) “How willing are you to abide by decisions that are reached using 
this procedure?”; (c) “How willing are you to cooperate with legal tribunals that 
make decisions using this procedure?”; (d) “How willing are you to engage with 
legal tribunals that use this procedure to make decisions?”; and (e) “How willing 
are you to respect legal decisions that are made using this procedure?” 
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and political orientation. Participants also answered whether 
they had previous experience with the courts and, if so, in what 
capacity. 
2. Results 
Results are reported in three parts. First, I conducted two 
preliminary analyses: (1) a reliability analysis for the index var-
iables representing witness credibility, perceived procedural jus-
tice, and perceived legitimacy;171 and (2) a CFA for the nine 
items measuring the extent to which the decision-making proce-
dures prioritized truth and justice. Second, I conducted the main 
analysis, which examined participants’ perceptions of the truth 
and justice produced by adversarial and inquisitorial procedures 
for resolving the legal dispute. Finally, I conducted a path anal-
ysis172 to determine the psychological pathways between the de-
cision-making procedure to which participants were exposed and 
their willingness to legitimize courts that use those procedures. 
a. Preliminary Analyses 
The first set of analyses examine the construction of three 
index variables from the items measuring witness credibility, 
perceived procedural justice, and perceived legitimacy (and the 
reliability of those indices). Each proposed index variable had 
satisfactory reliability; the individual items were therefore aver-
aged to form an index measuring witness credibility,173 perceived 
procedural justice,174 and perceived legitimacy175 to be used in 
the serial path analysis.  
As in Study 1, to construct the repeated-measures variable 
for the main analysis, I conducted a CFA on the items measuring 
 
 171. A reliability analysis examines how well different items purporting to 
measure a psychological construct correlate with each other, such that they can 
be averaged together as a measurement of the psychological construct. See 
FIELD, supra note 133, at 706–16 (explaining the meaning of reliability and how 
to conduct reliability analysis). 
 172. A path analysis (also referred to as a “mediation analysis”) consists of a 
series of regressions that seek to create a psychological pathway that explains 
the effect of a predictor variable on a dependent variable. See id. at 408–09 (ex-
plaining the definition of mediation analysis). For a detailed explanation of a 
path analysis, see infra notes 189–97 and accompanying text. 
 173. Three items, α = 0.85. 
 174. Three items, α = 0.91. 
 175. Five items, α = 0.95. 
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the perceived truth produced by the different procedures176 and 
the perceived justice that they provided.177 I again hypothesized 
a two-factor model to be confirmed by the CFA. The theorized 
model contained five truth items, which composed one factor of 
the model, and four justice items, which composed a second fac-
tor.178 Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the factors.  
Figure 7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 
Standard fitness measures indicated good fit between the 
theorized model and the data.179 The items that loaded onto the 
separate factors were averaged to form two scales, “Truth Pro-
duced”180 and “Justice Produced.”181 
b. Main Analysis 
To test the hypothesis that participants would perceive that 
different dispute resolution procedures differentially prioritize 
 
 176. See generally Sevier, supra note 38 (providing studies on perceived 
truth). 
 177. See generally Ambrose & Schminke, supra note 169 (providing studies 
on overall justice). 
 178. Because the data were normally distributed, I chose a maximum likeli-
hood estimation in evaluating model fit. As in Study 1, the “truth” and “justice” 
factors were permitted to be correlated based on prior evidence of a moderate 
relationship between these dimensions.  
 179. GFI, TLI, and CFI all > 0.90; RMSEA and SRMR both < 0.08. 
 180. Five items, α = 0.95. 
 181. Four items, α = 0.86. The scales were weakly and positively correlated, 
r(196) = 0.28, p < 0.001. 
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truth and justice, I conducted a 2 (procedure: adversarial vs. in-
quisitorial) x 2 (production: truth vs. justice) mixed-design 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the “production” variable. 
The analysis revealed a main effect of production,182 such that 
ratings of the truth produced by the procedure183 were higher 
than ratings of the justice produced by the procedure across all 
experimental conditions.184 The analysis also revealed a main ef-
fect of legal procedure,185 such that the composite of participants’ 
truth and justice ratings were higher in the adversarial condi-
tion186 than in the inquisitorial condition.187  
Most importantly, and as predicted, the analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between the procedure to which partici-
pants were exposed and their evaluations of the truth and justice 
produced by the procedure.188 Because I hypothesized that par-
ticipants would perceive the inquisitorial procedure as better at 
producing truth than the adversarial procedure, and that the ad-
versarial procedure would be better at producing justice than the 
inquisitorial procedure, I examined the nature of this interaction 
as a function of participants’ perceptions of truth and their per-
ceptions of justice. 
As predicted, an analysis of participants’ perceptions of the 
tribunal’s decisional accuracy revealed a significant effect of pro-
cedure,189 such that they perceived the inquisitorial procedure190 
as producing greater truth than the adversarial procedure.191 
Conversely, and as predicted, an analysis of participants’ percep-
tions of the court’s production of overall justice also revealed a 
significant effect of procedure,192 but with the adversarial  
procedure193 viewed as producing greater justice than the inquis-
itorial procedure.194 This significant interaction is illustrated in  
Figure 8. 
 
 182. F(1, 196) = 23.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11. 
 183. M = 4.88, SD = 1.42. 
 184. M = 4.36, SD = 1.45. 
 185. F(1, 196) = 7.68, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.04. 
 186. M = 4.85, SD = 1.17. 
 187. M = 4.40, SD = 1.47. 
 188. F(1, 196) = 87.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.31. 
 189. F(1, 196) = 6.59, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.03. 
 190. M = 5.13, SD = 1.43. 
 191. M = 4.62, SD = 1.37. 
 192. F(1, 196) = 60.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24. 
 193. M = 5.08, SD = 0.97. 
 194. M = 3.67, SD = 1.50. 
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Figure 8. Perceived Truth and Justice Produced by  
Procedure. 
c. Serial Path Analysis 
To understand the influence of a dispute resolution proce-
dure’s production of truth and justice on its perceived legitimacy, 
I conducted a multimediator analysis.195  
The analysis contained the following variables: (1) legal pro-
cedure as an independent variable;196 (2) the perceived credibil-
ity of the witnesses under the procedure, the perceived accuracy 
produced by the procedure, the perceived procedural justice pro-
 
 195. The multimediator analysis was conducted using Model 6 from Profes-
sor Andrew Hayes’s “PROCESS” statistical software macroinstruction. See AN-
DREW F. HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO MEDIATION, MODERATION, AND CONDI-
TIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS: A REGRESSION-BASED APPROACH 427–28, 446 
(2013) (presenting and explaining Andrew Hayes’s Model 6). A mediation anal-
ysis detects “when a predictor affects a dependent variable indirectly through 
at least one intervening variable, or mediator.” Kristopher J. Preacher & An-
drew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and Com-
paring Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 
879, 879 (2008). The mediation analysis reported in this Article is performed 
using a linear regression analysis and reports unstandardized coefficients, “b,” 
and standard errors, “SE.” It also reports a “t” statistic, which determines 
whether the coefficients are statistically significant. A linear regression is a sta-
tistical test that estimates the independent effects of several predictor variables 
on a continuous dependent variable. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 144, at 
257–69 (explaining the concept of linear regression). 
 196. This variable was coded as “0” for the adversarial procedure and “1” for 
the inquisitorial procedure. 
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duced by the procedure, and the perceived overall justice pro-
duced by the procedure as mediator variables; and (3) percep-
tions of the procedure’s legitimacy as a dependent variable. 
I first examined whether participants perceived adversarial 
and inquisitorial decision-making procedures to be differentially 
legitimate. As expected, the analysis revealed no significant dif-
ference in perceptions of legitimacy as a function of the proce-
dure to which participants were exposed.197 In examining the re-
lationship among a legal procedure, the truth it produces, the 
justice it produces, and its perceived legitimacy, I examined two 
indirect pathways: a truth pathway and a justice pathway. I ex-
amine these pathways separately below, through a series of lin-
ear regressions. 
Truth Path. To test the hypothesis that a legal procedure’s 
perceived legitimacy is, in part, a function of the amount of truth 
that the procedure is perceived to produce, I constructed a Truth 
path with (1) the legal procedure to which participants were ex-
posed as the independent variable, (2) the credibility of the wit-
nesses and the overall accuracy produced as mediator variables, 
and (3) perceptions of the procedure’s legitimacy as the depend-
ent variable.198  
The analysis yielded a significant effect of the procedure on 
the perceived credibility of the witnesses,199 reflecting greater 
perceived credibility of witnesses in the inquisitorial condition 
than in the adversarial condition. Witness credibility was, in 
turn, significantly associated with the legal procedure’s deci-
sional accuracy, such that where witnesses were perceived as 
more credible, perceptions of the tribunal’s decisional accuracy 
increased.200 Finally, perceptions of the tribunal’s decisional ac-
curacy were positively associated with perceptions of the tribu-
nal’s legitimacy.201 Importantly, this pathway composed a serial, 
indirect effect of the legal procedure to which participants were 
 
 197. Madversarial = 4.97, SDadversarial = 1.35; Minquisitorial = 4.98, SDinquisitorial = 1.61; 
F(1, 196) = 0.00, p = 0.962, η2p = 0.00. Because this analysis reveals a nonsignif-
icant total effect of the procedure to which participants were exposed on their 
subsequent perceptions of the legitimacy of the legal procedure, I fixed this re-
lationship to zero in the multimediator analysis that follows. 
 198. Witness credibility was included in the analysis because previous re-
search has found that it mediates the relationship between the legal procedure 
to which participants were exposed and their perceptions of the truth that the 
procedure produces. 
 199. b = 1.63, SE = 0.19, p < 0.001. 
 200. b = 0.56, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001. 
 201. b = 0.40, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001. 
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exposed on their perceptions of the tribunal’s legitimacy. The 
ninety-five percent bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap con-
fidence interval (BCaCI)202 for this indirect effect, based on 5,000 
samples, was statistically significant.203 
Justice Path. To test the hypothesis that a legal procedure’s 
perceived legitimacy is, in part, also a function of the amount of 
perceived justice that the procedure produces, I constructed a 
Justice path with (1) the legal procedure to which participants 
were exposed as the independent variable, (2) the degree to 
which participants experienced the components of procedural 
justice (including control, voice, and respect) and the overall jus-
tice produced as mediator variables, and (3) perceptions of the 
procedure’s legitimacy as the dependent variable.204  
The analysis yielded a significant effect of the procedure on 
perceptions of procedural justice, reflecting greater perceived 
control, voice, and respect afforded to litigants in the adversarial 
condition than in the inquisitorial condition.205 Greater per-
ceived control, voice, and respect afforded, in turn, were signifi-
cantly associated with the legal tribunal’s overall justice, such 
that greater procedural fairness increased perceptions of overall 
justice.206 Finally, perceptions of the overall justice produced by 
the legal procedure were positively associated with perceptions 
of the tribunal’s legitimacy.207 Importantly, this pathway also 
composed an indirect mediation effect of the legal procedure to 
 
 202. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric technique for testing indirect effects 
that does not assume that the variables of interest are normally distributed. 
The bootstrapping technique takes a large number of samples, with replace-
ment, from the data and computes the indirect effect for each sample. The 
ninety-five percent Confidence Interval (CI) is derived by sorting the elements 
of the vector of the indirect effect from low to high. For a sample of 5000, the 
250th score in the sorted distribution defines the lower limit of the CI, and the 
upper limit is defined as the 4751st score. If the CI does not include a value of 
zero, the indirect effect is statistically significant. See Kristopher J. Preacher & 
Andrew F. Hayes, SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect Effects in 
Simple Mediation Models, 36 BEHAV. RES. METHODS, INSTRUMENTS, & COM-
PUTERS 717 (2004). 
 203. Estimate = 0.37, SE = 0.12, BCaCI [0.11, 0.59]. 
 204. Procedural justice was included in the analysis because previous re-
search suggests that it is correlated with perceptions of overall justice, such that 
it may act as an antecedent cause. See Ambrose & Schminke, supra note 169. It 
is also differentially associated with different legal procedures. See Sevier, su-
pra note 38. 
 205. b = -1.90, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001. 
 206. b = 0.54, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001. 
 207. b = 0.48, SE = 0.08, p < 0.001. 
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which participants were exposed on their perceptions of the tri-
bunal’s legitimacy. The bias-corrected bootstrap CI for this indi-
rect effect, again based on 5000 samples, was statistically signif-
icant.208 Additionally, a contrast analysis revealed that the 
Justice pathway was a significantly stronger pathway to the tri-
bunal’s legitimacy than was the Truth pathway.209  
Additional paths. In addition to the two hypothesized path-
ways tested above, I tested all other possible indirect pathways 
composed of different combinations of the six variables involved 
in the path analyses, to determine other routes by which legal 
procedures attain popular legitimacy. The analysis revealed, in 
addition to the Truth and Justice pathways analyzed above, four 
statistically significant paths from the legal procedure to which 
participants were exposed to their perceptions of the procedure’s 
legitimacy. A series of contrast analyses revealed that all four 
additional paths were significantly weaker than the Justice 
pathway, and none were stronger than the Truth pathway. All 
significant paths are listed in Table 4, which includes their point 
estimate, standard error, and bootstrapped confidence interval. 
The table also provides measures of the comparative strength of 
all significant pathways. An illustration of the complete path 
model appears in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Multimediator Analysis. 
  
 
 208. Estimate = -0.49, SE = 0.13, BCaCI [-0.78, -0.36]. 
 209. Estimate = -0.57, SE = 0.09, BCaCI [-0.77, -0.42]. 
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Table 4. Significant Paths Between Legal Procedure and 
Perceived Legitimacy210 
 Estimate Boot. SE BCaCI 
“Justice” (X → J1 → J2 → Y) 0.48
a 0.14 [0.25, 0.79] 
“Truth” (X → T1 → T2 → Y) -0.38
b 0.12 [-0.65, -0.17] 
X → T1 → Y -0.37
b 0.13 [-0.63, -0.13] 
X → J2 → Y 0.23
c 0.10 [0.06, 0.44] 
X → T2 → Y 0.16
c 0.09 [0.01, 0.38] 
X → T1 → T2 → J2 → Y -0.10
d 0.04 [-0.18, -0.03] 
3. Discussion 
Study 2 builds on Study 1 in several ways, while confirming 
several hypotheses suggested in Thibaut and Walker’s A Theory 
of Procedure.211 Most importantly, the results strongly suggest 
that the psychological goals of establishing factual truth and pro-
ducing relational justice contribute to the public’s willingness to 
legitimize legal tribunals. Participants in this study legitimized 
legal disputes decided under adversarial methods and inquisito-
rial methods equally. But the pathway to legitimacy varied, such 
that the adversarial system achieved popular legitimacy through 
heightened perceptions of voice and procedural justice, whereas 
the inquisitorial system achieved popular legitimacy through 
perceived increases in the accuracy of the tribunal’s fact finding 
and the credibility of its witnesses. This study suggests that ad-
versarial and inquisitorial dispute resolution paradigms can 
both attain legitimacy, but through different pathways. Weak-
nesses with respect to one of these psychological goals do not nec-
essarily doom a legal procedure to illegitimacy but, especially if 
the procedure is low in relational justice, it increases the odds. 
Critically, the results reveal a tradeoff between adversarial 
and inquisitorial dispute resolution systems with respect to the 
psychological objectives that they prioritize. In this study, there 
 
 210. “X” denotes Legal Procedure, “T1” denotes Perceived Witness Credibil-
ity, “T2” denotes Perceived Accuracy, “J1” denotes Perceived Procedural Justice, 
“J2” denotes Perceived Overall Justice, and “Y” denotes Perceived Legitimacy. 
Estimates with different superscripts are significantly different at p < 0.05. 
 211. See supra Part I.A. 
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was a strong and statistically significant difference between the 
ability of the adversary system—where parties have significant 
control over the presentation of the evidence to the fact finder—
and the inquisitorial system—where the judge largely controls 
the collection of the evidence—to produce factual truth and to 
attain relational justice. Specifically, the adversary system was 
deemed superior to the inquisitorial system with respect to pro-
ducing fair decisions, whereas the inquisitorial system was su-
perior to the adversarial system in producing accurate decisions. 
Altogether, Study 1 suggests that the public associates dif-
ferent types of cases and trial phases with different psychological 
values and objectives, and Study 2 suggests that the public views 
different legal procedures as prioritizing these objectives differ-
ently. A question arises—untheorized and untested by Thibaut 
and Walker—whether the public prefers legal procedures whose 
priorities align with the conflict resolution objectives of the case 
in which the procedure is used. The final study in this series ad-
dresses this question. 
C. STUDY 3: INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 
Our final study seeks to extend the findings from Studies 1 
and 2 by examining the public’s preferences for legal procedures: 
specifically, whether participants prefer dispute resolution pro-
cedures whose priorities align better with the public’s perception 
of the objectives of the legal proceeding. The study therefore ma-
nipulated three variables. First, as in Study 1, I manipulated the 
type of case to which participants were exposed, as well as the 
phase of the trial presented to participants. Second, participants 
read about two different dispute resolution procedures—the ad-
versarial method and the inquisitorial method—and evaluated 
their fitness for resolving the legal dispute. I then measured par-
ticipants’ perceptions of the trial’s objectives, their opinions of 
the priorities of the procedures used to resolve the dispute, and 
their preferences for the two procedures. The following section 
reports the methodology and results of Study 3. 
1. Participants, Procedures, and Measures 
Three hundred thirty-nine American participants were re-
cruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $1.00 for 
their participation in Study 3. Participants were 55% female, av-
eraged 39.19 years of age (with a SD of 11.90), and ranged from 
20 to 72 years old. Sixty percent of the sample had completed at 
least a college degree, and the median income of the sample was 
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between $50,000 and $59,999. Forty-six percent of participants 
identified as politically liberal, 30% of participants identified as 
politically moderate, and 24% of participants identified as con-
servative.212  
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were told that the re-
searchers were interested in their opinions regarding different 
types of legal disputes. After providing their informed consent to 
participate in the study, they read about the hypothetical legal 
case that was the focus of Study 1, in which a defendant was 
accused of striking a small child with his vehicle on a dark, rainy 
night on a poorly-lit road.  
a. Experimental Manipulations 
As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to two 
different phases of the case: either the liability phase or the pun-
ishment phase. The remaining manipulations occurred within a 
repeated-measures design. Participants read, in random order, 
two different versions of the case: (a) the low-relationality ver-
sion, in which a factual determination was the central focus; or 
(b) the high-relationality version, in which a relational compari-
son was the central focus. 
Participants were then exposed to two different procedures 
by which the fact finder could resolve the dispute: (1) through an 
adversarial procedure (described as Option A), in which the par-
ties presented the evidence to the fact finder (and cross-exam-
ined the evidence produced by their adversaries); or (2) through 
an inquisitorial procedure (described as Option B), in which the 
judge would decide the evidence to collect and would primarily 
examine and question the witnesses. The information that the 
participants received regarding these two procedures appears in 
Table 5 below.  
b. Dependent Measures  
After participants completed attention and comprehension 
checks, they completed the dependent measures of the study. 
The dependent measures were administered in two phases. Par-
ticipants encountered the first set of dependent measures upon 
reading the facts of the case. To replicate the results of Study 1,  
  
 
 212. See supra tbl.1 for a complete description of the sample for this study. 
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participants were asked for their impressions of the purpose of 
the case along two dimensions: how much the case was primarily 
concerned with questions of truth and with questions of jus-
tice.213  
 
Table 5. Summary of Experimental Manipulations 
(Study 3). 
Case Type Cognitive Conflict Conflict of Interest 
 Participants were told that 
the perpetrator’s action was 
negligent, but that the de-
fendant disputes that he was 
the perpetrator.  
The court must collect evi-
dence (in the form of wit-
nesses and documents) to de-
termine whether the 
defendant in fact struck the 
victim. 
Participants were told that the 
perpetrator does not dispute 
that he struck the victim.  
The court must determine 
whether the level of caution 
that the defendant exhibited (as 
determined by witnesses and 
documents) was equal to what 
an “ordinary prudent person” 
in the community would have 





 Participants learned that each 
party would be allowed to 
call its own witnesses (includ-
ing expert witnesses) and 
could question those wit-
nesses. 
Each party would be permit-
ted to ask questions of the 
other party’s witnesses 
through cross-examination. 
Participants learned that the 
judge, not the parties, would 
call all of the witnesses and 
question them, including any 
expert witnesses.  
The parties would not be al-
lowed to cross-examine the wit-
nesses, although they would be 
allowed to ask minor clarifica-




 213. Participants answered, in random order, the same items that were pre-
sented in Study 1. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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Participants encountered the second set of dependent 
measures after they were presented with the two procedures by 
which the fact finder could resolve the dispute. Here, partici-
pants answered two sets of questions in random order. One set 
of questions consisted of nine items that measured participants’ 
perceptions of the truth and justice that would be produced by 
the procedures, as in Study 2. This time, however, the items were 
modified slightly to force participants to make direct compari-
sons between the adversarial method and the inquisitorial 
method. For example, one of the “Truth Produced” items in this 
study asked, on a seven-point Likert scale (anchored at Option 
A = -3 and Option B = +3), “Which Option will better lead the 
court to uncover the true facts?” An example of a modified “Jus-
tice Produced” item was “Under which Option will people be 
treated more fairly overall?” In addition to these nine items, par-
ticipants were asked to make two dichotomous choices: “Which 
Option will result in more truth being discovered?” and “Which 
Option treats parties more fairly?” All modified items used in 
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Table 6. Modified Procedural Choice Items.214 
Items Text 
Truth  
Item 1 Which Option will lead to a decision that is more accurate? 
Item 2 Which Option will better lead the court to uncover the facts? 
Item 3 Which Option will better reveal the information the court needs 
to make the right decision? 
Item 4 Which Option gives you greater confidence that the court will 
make a correct factual decision? 
Item 5 Which Option gives you more faith that the court will resolve 
the dispute correctly on the facts? 
  
Justice  
Item 1 Which Option will lead to fairer treatment of the parties to the 
dispute? 
Item 2 Under which Option can you count on people being treated 
fairly by the courts? 
Item 3 Which Option is more likely to lead to the fair treatment of par-
ties? 
Item 4 The way things work under which Option would create a fairer 
proceeding? 
Item 5 Which Option leads to better treatment of the parties in this 
case? 
Item 6 Under which Option do you think people would say they’ve 
been treated fairly? 
  
Dichotomous  
Item 1 Which Option will result in more “truth” being discovered? 
Item 2 Which Option treats people more fairly? 
 
The final set of dependent measures examined participants’ 
preferences for each procedure. Participants responded to three 
items, on seven-point Likert scales (anchored at Option A = -3 
 
 214. Truth and justice items were presented on a seven-point scale anchored 
at “Option A” and “Option B.” The dichotomous questions presented partici-
pants with a forced choice between Option A and Option B. 
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and Option B = +3): “In light of the proceeding you’ve read about, 
which Option for resolving the dispute do you prefer more?”; 
“Which Option do you like better, in light of goals of the proceed-
ing?”; and “Which Option would you choose (if you could) for re-
solving a dispute similar to the one you read about?” Partici-
pants also responded to one item with a dichotomous choice: 
“Which Option do you prefer better for resolving the legal case 
you read about?” These items were presented to participants in 
random order. 
After completing these dependent measures, participants 
repeated the process after being exposed to the second version of 
the case. Participants were told that their answers to the de-
pendent measures for the second version of the case might be the 
same as their answers to the questions following the first version 
of the case or that their answers might differ. Finally, as in Stud-
ies 1 and 2, participants answered a series of demographic ques-
tions before they were debriefed and the study concluded. 
2. Results 
This section proceeds in two parts. First, it analyzes the 
items that form the dependent measures in this study. Second, 
it attempts to replicate the results from Studies 1 and 2, and it 
examines participants’ preferences for different procedures used 
to resolve cases that differ in relationality.  
a. Preliminary Analyses 
The first set of analyses examined the construction of five 
index variables that will serve as predictors and dependent 
measures in Study 3. Each index variable had satisfactory relia-
bility; individual items were therefore averaged to form an index 
measuring truth objective, justice objective, truth production, 
justice production, and procedural preference.215 
b.  Main Analyses 
The analysis of the results of Study 3 is three-fold. First, the 
analysis attempts to replicate the two-way interactions, found in 
Study 1, between (1) case type and proceeding objective, and (2) 
trial phase and proceeding objective. Second, it attempts to con-
ceptually replicate the interaction, found in Study 2, between the 
 
 215. Truth objective: 5 items, α = 0.93; justice objective: 6 items, α = 0.93; 
truth production: 5 items, α = 0.96; justice production: 4 items, α = 0.93; and 
procedural preference: 3 items, α = 0.93. 
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legal procedure to which participants were exposed and their 
perceptions of the accuracy and justice produced by those proce-
dures. Finally, Study 3 extends these findings by examining 
whether participants prefer procedures that produce truth and 
justice in alignment with the type of case under dispute. 
Proceeding objectives. To replicate the results from Study 1, 
and to test the hypothesis that people’s perceptions of the objec-
tive of a legal proceeding differs as a function of the type of case 
and the phase in which the case is situated, I conducted a 2 (case 
type: low-relationality vs. high-relationality) x 2 (trial phase: li-
ability vs. punishment) x 2 (objective: truth vs. justice) 
ANOVA216 with repeated measures on the first and last variable. 
As expected, the analysis revealed two significant two-way inter-
actions between case type and objective,217 and between trial 
phase and objective.218  
As in Study 1, these two-way interactions revealed that low-
relationality cases and the liability phase of a trial were more 
associated with establishing truth than were high-relationality 
cases and the punishment phase of a trial.219 Conversely, high-
relationality cases and the punishment phase of a trial were 
more strongly associated with providing justice.220 
Legal Procedures. To conceptually replicate the results from 
Study 2, and to test the hypothesis that different legal proce-
dures prioritize different conflict resolution objectives, I con-
ducted a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ 
perceptions of which Option (A or B) would produce greater truth 
and greater justice. As expected, the analysis revealed a signifi-
cant effect of conflict objective.221 Participants more strongly as-
sociated Option B, the inquisitorial procedure, with establishing 
 
 216. See supra note 150. 
 217. F(1, 674) = 114.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15. 
 218. F(1, 674) = 129.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16. 
 219. For case type: M-non-relational = 4.95, SD = 1.63; M-relational = 4.36, 
SD = 1.66; F(1, 338) = 49.42, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.13. For trial phase: M-liability = 
5.37, SD = 2.60; M-restitution = 3.99, SD = 2.50; F(1, 337) = 100.19, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.23. 
 220. For case type, M-non-relational = 4.87, SD = 1.53; M-relational = 5.47, 
SD = 1.22; F(1, 338) = 59.33, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15. For trial phase, M-liability = 
4.80, SD = 2.29; M-restitution = 5.52, SD = 2.21; F(1, 337) = 34.66, p < 0.001, η2p 
= 0.09. 
 221. F(1, 676) = 29.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04. 
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truth compared to the adversarial procedure.222 Conversely, par-
ticipants more strongly associated Option A, the adversarial pro-
cedure, with providing justice.223 
Procedural Preferences. Finally, I examined whether partic-
ipants preferred legal procedures whose perceived production of 
truth or justice align with the perceived objective of the legal 
proceeding. To examine this hypothesis, I first examined partic-
ipants’ dichotomous choice between Option A and Option B in 
low-relationality and high-relationality cases. I supplemented 
this analysis by examining the strength of participants’ prefer-
ences for Option A and Option B in those cases. 
To test whether participants’ preferences for the adversarial 
procedure (Option A) and the inquisitorial procedure (Option B) 
depended on the type of case to which participants were exposed, 
I conducted a repeated-measures test of independence224 with 
the legal case (low vs. high relationality) as the predictor varia-
ble and participants’ choice between Option A and Option B as 
the dependent variable. As predicted, the analysis revealed a sig-
nificant effect of case type on participants’ choices,225 such that 
they preferred Option A (the adversarial procedure) to Option B 
(the inquisitorial procedure) in high-relationality cases,226 and 
vice versa in low-relationality cases.227 The shift in participants’ 




 222. M = 0.41, SD = 2.40. 
 223. M = -0.28, SD = 2.40. The midpoint of the seven-point Likert scale was 
set to zero. Positive mean scores indicate a preference for Option B (the inquis-
itorial model), whereas negative mean scores indicate a preference for Option A 
(the adversarial model). 
 224. A test of independence assesses whether unpaired observations of two 
categorical variables, expressed in a contingency table, are independent of each 
other. It is expressed as a chi-squared test statistic with a corresponding p-
value. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 144, at 220. 
 225. Cochran’s Q (df = 1, N = 339) = 75.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.22. 
 226. Option A = 67.00%, Option B = 33.00%. 
 227. Option A = 44.80%, Option B = 55.20%. 
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Figure 10. Procedural Preferences as a Function of the 
Relationality of the Proceeding. 
 
Finally, in light of the finding that participants preferred 
the adversarial procedure in high-relationality cases and pre-
ferred the inquisitorial procedure in low-relationality cases, I ex-
amined the strength of participants’ preferences for those proce-
dures. I conducted a one-way ANOVA with case type (relational 
vs. non-relational) as the predictor variable and participants’ de-
gree of preference for either Option A or Option B as the depend-
ent variable. As predicted, the ANOVA revealed a statistically 
significant effect of case type on the degree of participants’ pref-
erences for Option A and Option B,228 such that they leaned to-
ward the inquisitorial procedure in non-relational cases,229 and 
they exhibited a strong preference for the adversarial procedure 
in relational, “conflict of interest” cases.230  
Follow-up tests compared whether participants’ preferences 
for each procedure differed from the midpoint of the scale (set at 
zero), indicating a neutral view toward the procedures. The re-
sults revealed that, although participants favored the inquisito-
rial procedure (compared to the adversarial procedure) for re-
solving “cognitive conflict” cases, that preference did not differ 
statistically from a neutral position.231 Conversely, participants’ 
preference for the adversarial procedure in relational, “conflict 
 
 228. F(1, 338) = 69.27, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17. 
 229. M = -0.09, SD = 2.14. 
 230. M = 0.71, SD = 2.05. 
 231. t(338) = 0.79, p = 0.43, Cohen’s d = 0.04 (effect size). 
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of interest” cases did differ significantly from a neutral position 
on the Likert scale.232 The results with respect to the strength of 
participants’ procedural preferences are illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Strength of Preference for Dispute Resolution 
Procedures. 
3. Discussion 
Study 3 provides critical insights regarding the circum-
stances under which the public prefers—and is willing to legiti-
mize—different dispute resolution procedures. In this respect, 
Study 3 replicated the most important findings from Studies 1 
and 2: (1) that different types of disputes and trial phases are 
associated with different psychological objectives; and (2) that 
the different ways in which those disputes are resolved also are 
associated with those goals and values, in a manner that affects 
their popular legitimacy. Importantly, Study 3 extends these 
findings by demonstrating that an alignment of the proceeding’s 
perceived objective and the legal procedure’s perceived priorities 
results in legal decisions with greater popular legitimacy. Con-
versely, a misalignment between the proceeding’s objective and 
the legal procedure that resolves the proceeding leads to de-
creases in the decision maker’s perceived legitimacy. 
In this study, I found that participants far preferred the ad-
versarial dispute resolution procedure—which provides litigants 
with greater voice in the proceedings and increased feelings of 
 
 232. t(338) = -6.36, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.35 (effect size). 
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dignity and respect compared to the civil-law inquisitorial proce-
dure—in legal proceedings that are characterized as higher in 
relationality, and in which accurate fact finding is deemed a sub-
ordinate goal to producing relational justice. Moreover, although 
the strength of participants’ preference for the inquisitorial pro-
cedure was weaker, they preferred it to the adversarial proce-
dure when deciding cases high in “cognitive conflict,” in which 
the importance of accurate factual determinations is paramount. 
These findings have important implications for Thibaut and 
Walker’s A Theory of Procedure, the decisions of procedural pol-
icymakers, and for institutional design, as it relates to formal 
legal tribunals and alternative dispute resolution procedures. 
This Article now turns to these implications, the limitations of 
the findings reported here, and the future direction of this re-
search more generally. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirically-based approaches to institutional design pro-
vide critical information to legal policymakers.233 In designing a 
dispute resolution paradigm, policymakers are now, more than 
ever before, able to use real data to understand how litigants and 
the public at large value the paradigm’s effectiveness, in light of 
the purported goals associated with the proceeding, and whether 
they prefer the paradigm to its alternatives.234 Increased public 
support for a dispute resolution paradigm is a critical aspect of 
that paradigm’s ultimate success, longevity, and popular legiti-
macy.235 To that end, this Article examines John Thibaut and 
 
 233. See, e.g., Stephen Giacchino & Andrew Kakabadse, Successful Policy 
Implementation: The Route to Building Self-Confident Government, 69 INT’L 
REV. ADMIN. SCI. 139, 139 (2003) (drawing upon an empirical study to deter-
mine what factors influenced the successful implementation of public policy in 
Malta, and in what way the government should organize itself to best deliver 
the policy); see also Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New 
Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 147 (2013) (explaining 
that evidence-based policymaking offers much promise for improving federal 
civil rulemaking, especially to address questions of controlling access to the 
courts and the amount of litigation brought).  
 234. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun 
Policy, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 727 (2006) (explaining that empiri-
cal research can inform public policy on gun control by evaluating the public 
success of possible interventions and pinpointing the areas in which regulatory 
enforcement would be most effective). 
 235. Cf. Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Re-
view and an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 31 (2003) (commenting that public 
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Laurens Walker’s influential article on institutional design, A 
Theory of Procedure. It explicitly tests the empirical tenets of 
Thibaut and Walker’s theory; tests the tenets of a new, relational 
model of procedure; and explores the implications of the results 
to several aspects of legal dispute resolution. 
This Article tests a relational model of legal institutional le-
gitimacy, which claims that the public is more willing to legiti-
mize a legal tribunal’s decisions if the perceived objective of the 
conflict—either to discover the truth or to provide a just alloca-
tion of resources—aligns with the priorities of the procedures 
that are used to resolve the dispute.236 The results from the first 
study suggest that the public perceives legal dispute resolution 
as concerned with the complementary goals of establishing fac-
tual truth and providing a just allocation of resources to liti-
gants. But the first study also suggests that Thibaut and 
Walker’s theory is incomplete, insofar as it claims that all legal 
disputes primarily involve questions of justice.237 Instead, there 
is substantial variation in terms of the public’s perceptions of the 
objectives of different legal conflicts and in their perceptions of 
the objectives of different phases of a trial. 
The second study provides support for Thibaut and Walker’s 
claim that different dispute resolution procedures appear to pri-
oritize different conflict resolution objectives. Because the adver-
sary system provides litigants with substantial control and voice 
over the proceedings, they associate adversarial systems with 
prioritizing justice over factual truth. In contrast, the inquisito-
rial system is perceived to prioritize truth by vesting substantial 
investigatory authority in a central decision maker. Both proce-
dures can foster institutional legitimacy, but they do so in differ-
ent ways: the inquisitorial procedure fosters legitimacy through 
its emphasis on fact gathering, whereas the adversarial proce-
dure fosters legitimacy by prioritizing fair procedures for gath-
ering facts. 
The final study examines the implications for institutional 
legitimacy. It found that the public is most willing to legitimize 
legal tribunals when there is a relational alignment between the 
conflict resolution goal to be reached—either attaining the truth 
 
interest organizations can enhance policymakers’ responsiveness to public opin-
ion by providing useful information about what the public wants). 
 236. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 237. Their taxonomy also is incomplete insofar as it addresses the “effective-
ness” of legal procedures instead of their popular legitimacy. 
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or providing justice—and the priority of the procedure that re-
solves the dispute. Several implications flow from these findings 
for theories of institutional legitimacy, for actors involved in pub-
lic and private dispute resolution, and for the design of legal tri-
bunals. 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
Perhaps the most important result from these studies is 
that, contrary to Thibaut and Walker’s assertions, the public 
does not view all legal cases as relational conflicts that should be 
resolved through adversarial means. Instead, the public is will-
ing to sacrifice some procedural control—and the relational ben-
efits that come with it—in cases where questions of relationality 
are not the paramount issue to be resolved. Indeed, the results 
suggest that policymakers should consider the following reforms. 
First, the penalty phase of legal proceedings generally should be 
decided via adversarial methods, which prioritize the just allo-
cation of resources, at least compared to the liability phase.238 
Second, views of the appropriate procedure to evaluate disputes 
in the liability phase are heavily contingent on the degree of re-
lationality involved in the proceeding. Thus, whodunit trials, in 
which the defendant categorically denies the act of which he is 
civilly or criminally accused, should be afforded leeway to in-
clude inquisitorial methods to resolve the dispute, which priori-
tize establishing decisional accuracy. In contrast, questions in-
volving relational judgments—such as determining whether a 
defendant’s admitted acts constitute negligence—should nor-
mally be resolved pursuant to adversarial methods, which prior-
itize relational interests.  
Third, by reformulating Thibaut and Walker’s taxonomy of 
cases and procedures into a relationality continuum, several 
types of cases will fall within the margins. For example, certain 
breach of contract cases might have strong non-relational ele-
ments—such as the determination of what a contract term ob-
jectively means—that must be viewed in light of relational con-
cerns, such as what the terms meant to the different parties 
within the context of their business relationship with each other. 
In these cases, policymakers might experiment with combining 
 
 238. The analysis revealed a weaker difference between relational and non-
relational cases in the punishment context, although there may exist disputes 
in which inquisitorial methods are appropriate for the punishment phase. Fu-
ture research should examine this possibility. 
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features of adversarial and inquisitorial trials that will effectu-
ate the competing objectives. For example, the court might itself 
collect the evidence necessary to determine the meaning of a con-
tract (a feature of the inquisitorial paradigm) while allowing the 
parties to comment on the evidence or meaningfully cross-exam-
ine witnesses to assess each party’s subjective understanding of 
the contract terms (a feature of the adversarial paradigm). 
Rethinking Thibaut and Walker’s dispute classifications 
along a relationality continuum would allow legal tribunals to 
attain greater popular legitimacy. For example, in an ordinary 
negligence case, it may initially appear beneficial to create ex-
pensive procedures that are well-calibrated to determine the ex-
act speed a vehicle was traveling, the precise amount of daylight 
that existed when the accident occurred, or the exact amount of 
foliage that obscured a driver’s view. But the resources invested 
in that procedure would be ill-spent if the public perceives the 
tribunal’s ultimate decision to be a holistic, relational judgment 
in which the defendant’s actions are compared to in-group 
norms. There, the factual predicates, although important, are 
not the primary determinant of the outcome and would be sub-
ordinate to the relational judgment, which a different procedure 
might prioritize better.  
Conversely, other scholars have commented on the in-
creased “scientization” of proof in various legal settings,239 an in-
evitable consequence of the expanding role of technology in the 
legal context.240 As relevant technology for resolving disputes 
improves, the relationality continuum allows those disputes to 
move fluidly along the spectrum in favor of more inquisitorial 
procedures. In that sense, procedural reforms would be able to 
keep pace with the evolving types of proof that appear in these 
trials (and presumably with the objectives that are valued the 
most).  
Additionally, in cases in which, for example, the truth objec-
tive is the predominant concern because of increased “scientiza-
 
 239. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 145 (1997) 
(“More than the court’s paradigmatic composition, the scientization of proof 
strains the traditional concept of the trial as a continuous, climatic event.”).  
 240. For a thorough critique of the dangers of the “seconding” of scientific 
technology into the legal system, see COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE 
FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs 
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QT7-PNYD]. 
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tion,” policymakers could consider concomitant reforms to evi-
dentiary rules and local court customs to facilitate the truth-
seeking objective. Specifically, where a central inquisitorial 
body—either a single judge or a judge and jury241—selects the 
information by which the dispute is decided, it may be advanta-
geous to relax or eliminate the restrictions on character evidence 
and hearsay, in light of empirical evidence suggesting that these 
rules may unnecessarily stymie the accurate fact-finding en-
deavor.242  
These reforms may be easier to adopt initially in the alter-
native dispute resolution context, which generally does not re-
quire the parties to adhere to the formal procedural rules of the 
courtroom.243 Nonetheless, a full-scale, immediate redesign of 
the current procedural regime would not be prudent or possible. 
Rather, these reforms might develop as a result of incremental 
changes, such as adding or removing certain relational or non-
relational design features over time. The results from the studies 
reported in this Article, and the empirical findings from which 
the studies here were derived, provide policymakers with a 
roadmap to effectuate those changes.  
Skeptics might criticize the cost of implementing the policy 
recommendations that flow from the results of these studies. Do-
ing so would require extensive classifications not just of different 
types of cases—and their conflict resolution objectives—but also 
 
 241. Articles VI and VII of the United States Constitution allow trials by 
jury for certain alleged wrongs; these protections have also been extended, to 
varying extents, to citizens in state tribunals. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 
U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (affirming the right to a six-person jury in federal civil 
trials); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (extending the jury right 
to defendants charged with serious crimes). 
 242. See, e.g., Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and 
Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879 (2015) (criticizing the hearsay rule); 
David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 407 (2013) (criticizing the rules regarding evidentiary instructions); H. 
Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing 
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 789–93 (1993) (criticizing the char-
acter evidence rule). The procedural reforms suggested by the results reported 
here may also result in the reform of substantive contract, tort, or criminal law 
principles. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to address these issues 
here, the results I report can serve as a springboard for further academic debate 
regarding the interrelation between procedural and substantive legal reforms. 
 243. See, e.g., LAURIE S. COLTRI, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A 
CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH (2d ed. 2010) (explaining the basic principles 
and tenets of mediation and arbitration procedures). 
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of varying procedures for resolving those disputes. Difficult deci-
sions would need to be made regarding where a dispute falls on 
the relationality continuum and which procedural features 
would be the most appropriate for resolving the dispute. Moreo-
ver, the act of making substantial changes to entrenched legal 
norms might be disruptive enough to threaten the popular legit-
imacy of the new institutional design. 
These are legitimate concerns that policymakers should re-
view carefully. Policy change and implementation is never cost-
less; it necessarily involves a complex cost-benefit analysis bal-
ancing the benefits of the new institutional design against the 
drawbacks associated with (1) the disruption created by a new 
system, and (2) the costs that the new system itself may impose 
on the public. Procedural reforms consistent with the empirical 
results reported in this Article—for example, rethinking por-
tions of evidentiary rules in cases in which an inquisitorial tri-
bunal makes a criminal liability determination—might result in 
constitutional challenges involving, for example, the defendant’s 
right to confront her accuser. Other commentators have provided 
answers to these types of questions,244 but the potential for such 
disputes imposes additional costs on litigants. 
Nonetheless, large-scale and small-scale policy change hap-
pens frequently under the law. Moreover, the recommendations 
suggested here may have unique advantages that can aid their 
implementation. First, unlike other areas of the law where em-
pirical research is inchoate or newly developing, the research on 
institutional legitimacy has accumulated a critical mass of peer-
reviewed scholarship that converges on several principles for ef-
fective institutional design.245 Moreover, there is a wealth of re-
spected scholars—in the United States and internationally—
who produce cutting-edge research in this area. The United 
States Congress, many of its state counterparts, and various 
think tanks across the country also are staffed with individuals 
who are qualified to evaluate this research and to implement its 
recommendations in ways that minimize disruption.246 
 
 244. See, e.g., Fern Nesson & Charles Nesson, Confrontation: Getting It 
Right, HARV. L. REC. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://hlrecord.org/confrontation-getting-it 
-right/ [https://perma.cc/M46Z-W33H]. 
 245. See generally Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14 (reviewing a litany of ex-
perimental evidence suggesting that a values-based approach to institutional 
design is superior to a punishment-based approach). 
 246. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legis-
lative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 13–16 (2009). This process has resulted in 
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These resources are critically important with respect to the 
recommendations that flow from the findings reported here. 
These studies specifically examined the outer bounds of the re-
lationality continuum—for example, cases that were either very 
low or high in relationality—and did not focus on disputes that 
form the interior of the continuum.247 When testing a new the-
ory, it is necessary to examine the outer boundaries first before 
determining whether further research is warranted. Once those 
boundaries are established, future research, either in the form 
of academic scholarship or research in the political realm, will 
contribute valuable insight into the nuances inherent in the re-
lationality continuum. 
Second, there are forums within the legal system that are 
equipped for experimenting with institutional design features. 
Several state courts across the country serve as “innovation la-
boratories” for policy changes affecting the administration of 
trial proceedings.248 One of the most well-known of these real-
world laboratories is the Arizona Jury Project, which specializes 
in procedural reforms that relate to jury decisionmaking.249 The 
participating Arizona trial courts have allowed judges and attor-
neys to experiment with varying “local” rules, such as allowing 
jurors to take notes during the proceedings, allowing them to ask 
questions of witnesses and the parties, and allowing them to con-
sult with one another while the case is in progress.250 These la-
boratories might be the ideal testing grounds for similar proce-
dural innovations suggested by the findings reported in this 
Article. 
 
dramatic procedural reforms, including the development of specialty tribunals 
like the Delaware Court of Chancery and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. Id. 
 247. Several countries, such as Italy, employ hybrid inquisitorial procedures 
to resolve legal conflicts. The specifics of these hybrids vary, but they often in-
corporate an element of cross-examination that supplements the primary fact-
finding authority of the central decision maker. See, e.g., JOACHIM ZEKOLL, 
COMPARATIVE CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW (2006). 
 248. See, e.g., Justin Sevier, The Unintended Consequences of Local Rules, 
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 293 (2011). 
 249. See, e.g., Stephen Susman, Innovative Jury Trials, CIV. JURY PROJECT 
AT NYU SCH. L. (Aug. 19, 2017), https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/innovative 
-jury-trials/ [https://perma.cc/JV45-KT8F] (discussing the achievements of the 
Arizona Jury Project and its cousin, the NYU Civil Jury Project, among others). 
 250. Id.; see also Sevier, supra note 248, at 300. 
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Finally, and more generally, skeptics might question the use 
of empirical evidence in debates over legal policy. As I have writ-
ten recently in more detail:  
The judiciary has historically had a complex relationship with social 
science . . . . Empirical studies have shaped legal policy in a variety of 
areas, including eyewitness identification, false confessions, the size 
and shape of juries, the manner of proving discrimination, the regula-
tion of corporate behavior, and the implementation of the death pen-
alty. It is, of course, important not to overstate the implications of any 
one empirical study. But it is also important to situate empirical stud-
ies within the literature on which they are based to draw appropriate 
and measured conclusions about their findings.251 
CONCLUSION 
Mary Churukian and Clayton LaGest likely did not know 
that their run-of-the-mill vehicular negligence dispute would 
provoke such lofty, philosophical questions from the justices of 
the Michigan Supreme Court regarding the purpose of conflict 
resolution and its intersection with institutional design.252 What 
they likely did know, however, was the extent to which they were 
willing to abide by the legal tribunal’s decision as a function of 
the manner in which it evaluated the case. 
The findings reported in this Article—and the literature on 
institutional design in which those findings are situated—sug-
gest that legal policymakers would do well to ensure that the 
objectives of different legal disputes align with the relational sig-
nals that the procedures which resolve those disputes send to 
litigants. Doing so will likely result in a dispute resolution sys-
tem that aligns more closely with the public’s values and policy 
preferences, and in turn, greater public legitimacy. 
 
 
 251. Sevier, supra note 82, at 507 (citing ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND 
LAW (Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein eds., 3d vol. 2018)). The design of 
Study 3 in this Article allowed for a conceptual replication of the findings re-
ported in Studies 1 and 2. The results from those studies replicated in Study 3. 
See supra Part III.C.2. 
 252. Churukian v. LaGest, 97 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1959); see supra notes 1–
12 and accompanying text. 
